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Abstract. We provide a graphical illustration of how standard consumer and pro-
ducer theory can be used to quantify the welfare loss associated with ine¢ cient pricing
in insurance markets with selection. We then show how this welfare loss can be esti-
mated empirically using identifying variation in the price of insurance. Such variation,
together with quantity data, allows us to estimate the demand for insurance. The same
variation, together with cost data, allows us to estimate how insurers costs vary as
market participants endogenously respond to price. The slope of this estimated cost
curve provides a direct test for both the existence and nature of selection, and the com-
bination of demand and cost curves can be used to estimate welfare. We illustrate our
approach by applying it to data on employer-provided health insurance from one spe-
cic company. We detect adverse selection but estimate that the quantitative welfare
implications associated with ine¢ cient pricing in our particular application are small,
in both absolute and relative terms.
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I. Introduction
The welfare loss from selection in private insurance markets is a classic result in economic theory. It
provides, among other things, the textbook economic rationale for the near-ubiquitous government
intervention in insurance markets. Yet there has been relatively little empirical work devoted to
quantifying the ine¢ ciency that selection causes in a particular insurance market, or the welfare
consequences of potential policy interventions in that market. This presumably reects not a lack
of interest in this important topic, but rather the considerable challenges posed by empirical welfare
analysis in markets with hidden information.
Recently, there have been several attempts to estimate the welfare costs of private information
in particular insurance markets, specically annuities (Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf 2009) and
health insurance (Carlin and Town 2007; Bundorf, Levin, and Mahoney 2008; Lustig 2008). These
papers specify and estimate a structural model of insurance demand that is derived from the
choices of optimizing agents, and recover the underlying (privately known) information about risk
and preferences. This allows for rich, out of sample, counterfactual welfare analysis. However, it
requires the researcher to make critical assumptions about the nature of both the utility function and
individualsprivate information. These modeling choices can have non-trivial e¤ects on the welfare
estimates. Moreover, they are often specic to the particular market studied, making it di¢ cult to
meaningfully compare welfare estimates across markets or to readily adapt these approaches from
one context to another.
Our objective in this paper is therefore to propose a complementary approach to empirical
welfare analysis in insurance markets. We make fewer assumptions about the underlying primitives,
yet impose enough structure to allow for meaningful welfare analysis. These fewer assumptions come
at the cost of limiting our welfare analyses to only those associated with the pricing of existing
contracts.
We start in Section II by showing how standard consumer and producer theory  familiar to
any student of intermediate micro can be applied to welfare analysis of insurance markets with
selection. As emphasized by Akerlof (1970) and Stiglitz (1987) among others, the key feature of
markets with selection is that rmscosts depend on which consumers purchase their products.
As a result, insurers costs are endogenous to price. Welfare analysis therefore requires not only
knowledge of how demand varies with price, but also information on how changes in price a¤ect
the costs of insuring the (endogenous) market participants. We use these insights to provide a
particular graphical representation of the welfare cost of ine¢ cient pricing arising from selection.
We view these graphs as providing helpful intuition, and therefore as an important contribution of
the paper. The graphs illustrate, among other things, how the qualitative nature of the ine¢ ciency
depends on whether the selection is adverse or advantageous.
Our graphical analysis also suggests a straightforward empirical approach to welfare analysis
of pricing in insurance markets. Section III shows how our framework translates naturally into a
series of estimating equations, and discusses the data requirements. The key observation is that the
same pricing variation that is needed to estimate the demand curve (or willingness to pay) in any
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welfare analysis be it the consequences of tax policy, the introduction of new goods, or selection
in insurance markets can also be used to estimate the cost curve in selection markets, i.e. how
costs vary as the set of market participants endogenously changes. The slope of the estimated cost
curve provides a direct test of the existence and nature of selection that unlike the widely used
bivariate probittest for asymmetric information (Chiappori and Salanie 2000) is not a¤ected
by the existence (or lack thereof) of moral hazard. Specically, rejection of the null hypothesis of a
constant (i.e. horizontal) marginal cost curve allows us to reject the null hypothesis of no selection,
while the sign of the slope of the marginal cost curve tells us whether the resultant selection is
adverse (if marginal cost is increasing in price) or advantageous (if marginal cost is decreasing in
price).
Most importantly, with both the demand and cost curves in hand, welfare analysis of ine¢ cient
pricing caused by any detected selection is simple and familiar. In the same vein, the estimates
lend themselves naturally to welfare analysis of a range of counterfactual public policies that change
the price of existing contracts. These include insurance mandates, subsidies or taxes for private
insurance, and regulation of the prices that private insurers can charge.
Our approach has several attractive features. First, it does not require the researcher to make
(often di¢ cult to test) assumptions about consumer preferences or the nature of their ex ante
information. As long as we accept revealed preference, the demand and cost curves are su¢ cient
statistics for welfare analysis of the pricing of existing contracts. In this sense, our approach is
similar in spirit to Chetty (2008) and Chetty and Saez (2008) who show how key ex-post behavioral
elasticities are su¢ cient statistics for welfare analysis of the optimal level of public insurance benets
(see also Chetty [2009] for a more general discussion of the use of su¢ cient statistics for welfare
analysis).
Second, our approach is relatively straightforward to implement, and therefore potentially
widely applicable. In particular, while cost data are often quite di¢ cult to obtain in many prod-
uct markets (so that direct estimation of the cost curve is often a challenge), direct data on costs
tend to be more readily available in insurance markets since they require information on accident
occurrences or insurance claims, rather than insight into the underlying production function of the
rm. In addition, the omnipresent regulation of insurance markets o¤ers many potential sources
for pricing variation needed to estimate the demand and cost curves. Third, the approach is fairly
general as it does not rely on specic institutional details; as a result, estimates of the welfare cost
of adverse selection in di¤erent contexts may be more comparable.
These attractive features are not without cost. As mentioned already, the chief limitation of our
approach is that our analysis of the welfare cost of adverse selection is limited to the cost associated
with ine¢ cient pricing of a xed (and observed) set of contracts. Our approach therefore does not
allow us to capture the welfare loss that adverse selection may create by distorting the set of
contracts o¤ered, which in many settings could be large.1 In the end of Section III we discuss in
1A related limitation is that our approach forces us to rely on uncompensated (Marshallian) demand for welfare
analysis. To account for income e¤ects, we would either need to assume them away (by assuming constant absolute
risk aversion) or to impose more structure and specify a full model of primitives that underlies the demand function.
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some detail the settings where this limitation may be less prohibitive.
Analysis of the welfare e¤ects of distortions in the contract space due to selection  or of
counterfactual public policies that introduce new contracts  requires modeling and estimating
the structural primitives underlying the demand and cost curves, and it is in this sense that we
view our approach as complementary to a full model of these primitives. We note, however, that
although such richer counterfactuals are feasible with a more complete model of the primitives, in
practice the existing papers (mentioned above) that fully modeled these primitives have primarily
conned themselves to welfare analyses of the pricing of existing contracts, as we do in this paper.
This presumably reects both researchers(understandable) caution in taking their estimates too
far out of sample, as well as the considerable empirical and theoretical challenges to modeling the
endogenous contract response (Einav, Finkelstein, and Levin 2010). Perhaps similar reasons may
also explain why many (although not all) government interventions in insurance markets tend to
focus on the pricing of contracts through taxes and subsidies, regulations, or mandates.
The last part of the paper (Section IV) provides an illustration of our approach by applying it
to the market for employer-provided health insurance in the United States, a market of substantial
interest in its own right. The existing empirical evidence on this market is consistent with asym-
metric information (see Cutler and Zeckhauser [2000] for a review). However, until recently there
has been relatively little empirical work on the welfare consequences of the detected market failure.
Cutler and Reber (1998) is a notable exception. Like us, they analyze selection in employer-provided
health insurance, and, like us, they also estimate the demand curve. A key distinction, however, is
that while they provide important and novel evidence of the existence of adverse selection in the
market, they do not estimate the cost curve, which is crucial for welfare analysis.
We utilize rich individual-level data from Alcoa, Inc., a large multinational producer of alu-
minum and related products. We observe the health insurance options, choices, and medical insur-
ance claims of its employees in the United States. We use the fact that, due to Alcoas organizational
structure, employees doing similar jobs in di¤erent sections of the company are faced with di¤erent
prices associated with otherwise identical sets of coverage options. We verify that pricing appears
orthogonal to the characteristics of the employees that the managers setting these prices can likely
observe. Using this price variation, we estimate that marginal cost is increasing in price, and thus
detect adverse selection in this market. However, we estimate the welfare costs associated with
the ine¢ cient pricing created by adverse selection to be small. Specically, we estimate that in
a competitive market the annual e¢ ciency cost of this selection would be just below $10 per em-
ployee, or about 3% of the total surplus at stake from e¢ cient pricing. By way of comparison, this
estimated welfare cost is an order of magnitude lower than our estimate of the dead weight loss
that would arise from monopolistic pricing in this market. We also estimate that the social cost of
public funds for the price subsidy that would be required to move from the (ine¢ cient) competitive
equilibrium to the e¢ cient outcome is about ve times higher than our estimate of the welfare
gain from achieving the e¢ cient allocation. These results are robust across a range of alternative
specications.
It is extremely important to emphasize that there is no general lesson in our empirical ndings.
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Our estimates are specic to our population and to the particular health insurance choices they face.
Nonetheless, at a conceptual level, our ndings highlight the importance of moving beyond detection
of market failures to quantifying their welfare implications. Our particular ndings provide an
example of how it is possible for adverse selection to exist, and to impair market e¢ ciency, without
being easily remediable through standard public policies.
II. Theoretical framework
II.A. Model
Setup and notation. We consider a situation in which a given population of individuals is allowed
to choose from exactly two available insurance contracts, one that o¤ers high coverage (contract
H) and one that o¤ers less coverage (contract L). As we discuss in more detail below, it is
conceptually straightforward to extend the analysis to more than two contracts, but substantially
complicates the graphical presentation. To further simplify the exposition, we assume that contract
L is no insurance and is available for free, and that contract H is full insurance. These are merely
normalizations and straightforward to relax; indeed we do so in our empirical application.
A more important assumption is that we take the characteristics of the insurance contracts as
given, although we allow the price of insurance to be determined endogenously. As we discuss in
more detail in Section III below, this seems a reasonable characterization of many insurance markets;
it is often the case that the same set of contracts are o¤ered to observably di¤erent individuals,
with variation across individuals only in the pricing of the contracts, and not in o¤ered coverage.
Our analysis is therefore in the spirit of Akerlof (1970) rather than Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976),
who endogenize the level of coverage as well.
We dene the population by a distribution G(), where  is a vector of consumer character-
istics. A key aspect of the analysis is that we do not specify the nature of ; it could describe
multi-dimensional risk factors, consumersex-ante risk perception, and/or preferences. We denote
the (relative) price of contract H by p, and denote by vH(i; p) and v
L(i) consumer is (with
characteristics i) utility from buying contracts H and L, respectively. Although not essential, it is
natural to assume that vH(i; p) is strictly decreasing in p and that v
H(i; p = 0) > v
L(i). Finally,
we denote the expected monetary cost associated with the insurable risk for individual i by c(i).
For ease of exposition, we assume that these costs do not depend on the contract chosen, i.e. that
there is no moral hazard. We relax this assumption in Section II.D, where we show that allowing
for moral hazard does not substantively a¤ect the basic analysis.
Demand for insurance. We assume that each individual makes a discrete choice of whether to
buy insurance or not. Since we take as given that there are only two available contracts and their
associated coverages, demand is only a function of the (relative) price p. We assume that rms
cannot o¤er di¤erent prices to di¤erent individuals. To the extent that rms can make prices depend
on observed characteristics, one should think of our analysis as applied to a set of individuals that
only vary in unobserved (or unpriced) characteristics. We assume that if individuals choose to buy
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insurance they buy it at the lowest price at which it is available, so it is su¢ cient to characterize
demand for insurance as a function of the lowest price p.
Given the above assumptions, individual i chooses to buy insurance if and only if vH(i; p) 
vL(i). We can dene (i)  max

p : vH(i; p)  vL(i)
	
, which is the highest price at which
individual i is willing to buy insurance. Aggregate demand for insurance is therefore given by
D(p) =
Z
1 (()  p) dG() = Pr ((i)  p) ; (1)
and we assume that the underlying primitives imply that D(p) is strictly decreasing, continuous,
and di¤erentiable.
Supply and equilibrium. We consider N  2 identical risk neutral insurance providers, who set
prices in a Nash Equilibrium (a-la Bertrand). Although various forms of imperfect competition
may characterize many insurance markets, we choose to focus on the case of perfect competition
as it represents a natural benchmark for welfare analysis of the e¢ ciency cost of selection; under
perfect competition, symmetric information leads to e¢ cient outcomes, so that any ine¢ ciency
can be attributed to selection and does not depend on the details of the pricing model. We note
however that it is straightforward to replicate the theoretical and empirical analysis for any other
given model of the insurance market, including models of imperfect competition.
We further assume that when multiple rms set the same price, individuals who decide to
purchase insurance at this price choose a rm randomly. We also assume that the only costs of
providing contract H to individual i are the insurable costs c(i).
2 The foregoing assumptions
imply that the average (expected) cost curve in the market is given by
AC(p) =
1
D(p)
Z
c()1 (()  p) dG() = E (c()j()  p) : (2)
Note that the average cost curve is determined by the costs of the sample of individuals who
endogenously choose contract H. The marginal (expected) cost curve3 in the market is given by
MC(p) = E (c()j() = p) : (3)
In order to straightforwardly characterize equilibrium, we make two further simplifying assump-
tions. First, we assume that there exists a price p such that D(p) > 0 and MC(p) < p for every
p > p. In words, we assume that it is protable (and e¢ cient, as we will see soon) to provide in-
surance to those with the highest willingness to pay for it.4 Second, we assume that if there exists
p such that MC(p) >p then MC(p) > p for all p <p. That is, we assume that MC(p) crosses the
2Note that c(i) reects only direct insurer claims (i.e. payout) costs, and not other administrative (production)
costs of the insurance company. We discuss in Section III.B below how such additional costs can be incorporated into
the analysis.
3Note that there could be multiple marginal consumers. Because price is the only way to screen in our setup, all
these consumers will together average (point-by-point) to form the marginal cost curve.
4This assumption seems to hold in our application. Bundorf, Levin, and Mahoney (2008) make the interesting
observation that there are contexts where it may not hold.
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demand curve at most once.5 It is easy to verify that these assumptions guarantee the existence and
uniqueness of equilibrium. In particular, the equilibrium is characterized by the lowest break-even
price, that is:
p = min fp : p = AC(p)g : (4)
II.B. Measuring welfare
We measure consumer surplus by the certainty equivalent. The certainty equivalent of an uncertain
outcome is the amount that would make an individual indi¤erent between obtaining this amount for
sure and obtaining the uncertain outcome. An outcome with a higher certainty equivalent therefore
provides higher utility to the individual. This welfare measure is attractive as it can be measured
in monetary units. Total surplus in the market is the sum of certainty equivalents for consumers
and prots of rms. Throughout we ignore any income e¤ects associated with price changes.6
Denote by eH(i) and e
L(i) the certainty equivalent of consumer i from an allocation of contract
H and L, respectively; under the assumption that all individuals are risk averse, the willingness to
pay for insurance is given by (i) = e
H(i)  eL(i) > 0. We can write consumer welfare as
CS =
Z  
eH()  p 1 (()  p) + eL()1 (() < p) dG() (5)
and producer welfare as
PS =
Z
(p  c()) 1 (()  p) dG(): (6)
Total welfare will then be given by
TS = CS + PS =
Z  
eH()  c() 1 (()  p) + eL()1 (() < p) dG(): (7)
It is now easy to see that it is socially e¢ cient for individual i to purchase insurance if and only if
(i)  c(i): (8)
In other words, in a rst best allocation individual i purchases insurance if and only if his willingness
to pay is at least as great as the expected social cost of providing to him the insurance.7
5 In the most basic economic framework of insurance the di¤erence between () and MC() is the risk premium,
and is positive for risk averse individuals. If all individual are risk averse, MC() will never cross the demand curve.
In practice, however, there are many reasons for such crossing. Those include, among others, loading factors on
insurance, moral hazard, and horizontal product di¤erentiation. As a result it may not be socially e¢ cient for all
individuals to have insurance, even if they are all risk averse.
6 In a textbook expected utility framework, this is equivalent to assuming that the utility function exhibits constant
absolute risk aversion (CARA). When the premium changes are small relative to the individuals income (as in the
choice we study in our empirical application below) it seems natural to view CARA as a reasonable approximation.
An alternative would be to fully specify the underlying utility function, from which income e¤ects can be derived.
This is one additional limitation of our simpler approach.
7 Implicit in this discussion is that insurer claims c(i) represent the full social cost associated with allocating
insurance to individual i. To the extent that this is not the case, for example due to positive or negative externalities
associated with insurance or imperfections in the production of the underlying good that is being insured, our measure
of welfare would have to be adjusted accordingly.
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In many contexts (including our application below), price is the only instrument available to
a¤ect the insurance allocation. In such cases, achieving the rst best may not be feasible if there
are multiple individuals with di¤erent c(i)s who all have the same willingness to pay for contract
H (see footnote 3). It is therefore useful to dene a constrained e¢ cient allocation as the one
that maximizes social welfare subject to the constraint that price is the only instrument available
for screening. Using our notation, this implies that it is (constrained) e¢ cient for individual i to
purchase contract H if and only if
(i)  E(c(e)j(e) = (i)): (9)
That is, if and only if (i) is at least as great as the expected social cost of allocating contract
H to all individuals with willingness to pay (i). We use this constrained e¢ cient benchmark
throughout the paper, and hereafter refer to it simply as the e¢ cient allocation.8
II.C. Graphical representation
We use the framework sketched above to provide a graphical representation of adverse and advanta-
geous selection. Although the primary purpose of doing so is to motivate and explain the empirical
estimation strategy, an important ancillary benet of these graphs is that they provide what we
believe to be helpful intuition for the e¢ ciency costs of di¤erent types of selection in insurance
markets.
Adverse selection. Figure I provides a graphical analysis of adverse selection. The relative price
(or cost) of contract H is on the vertical axis. Quantity (i.e. share of individuals in the market with
contract H) is on the horizontal axis; the maximum possible quantity is denoted by Qmax. The
demand curve denotes the relative demand for contract H. Likewise, the average cost (AC) curve
and marginal cost (MC) curve denote the average and marginal incremental costs to the insurer
from coverage with contract H relative to contract L.
The key feature of adverse selection is that the individuals who have the highest willingness to
pay for insurance are those who, on average, have the highest expected costs. This is represented in
Figure I by drawing a downward slopingMC curve. That is, marginal cost is increasing in price and
decreasing in quantity. As the price falls, the marginal individuals who select contract H have lower
expected cost than infra-marginal individuals, leading to lower average costs. The essence of the
private information problem is that rms cannot charge individuals based on their (privately known)
marginal cost, but are instead restricted to charging a uniform price, which in equilibrium implies
average cost pricing. Since average costs are always higher than marginal costs, adverse selection
creates under-insurance, a familiar result rst pointed out by Akerlof (1970). This under-insurance
is illustrated in Figure I. The equilibrium share of individuals who buy contract H is Qeqm (where
8See Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) who analyze e¢ ciency in an environment with a similar constraint. See also
Bundorf, Levin, and Mahoney (2008) who investigate the e¢ ciency consequences of relaxing this constraint. In a
symmetric information case, the rst best could be achieved by letting prices fully depend on (i) and c(i).
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the AC curve intersects the demand curve), while the e¢ cient number is Qeff > Qeqm (where the
MC curve intersects the demand curve).
The welfare loss due to adverse selection is represented by the shaded region CDE in Figure
I. This represents the lost consumer surplus from individuals who are not insured in equilibrium
(because their willingness to pay is less than the average cost of the insured population) but
whom it would be e¢ cient to insure (because their willingness to pay exceeds their marginal cost).
One could similarly evaluate and compare welfare under other possible allocations. For example,
mandating that everyone buy contract H generates welfare equal to the area ABE minus the area
EGH. This can be compared to welfare at the competitive equilibrium (area ABCD), welfare at the
e¢ cient allocation (area ABE), welfare from mandating everyone to buy contract L (normalized
to zero), or the welfare e¤ect of policies that subsidize (or tax) the equilibrium price. The relative
welfare rankings of these alternatives is an open empirical question. A primary purpose of the
proposed framework is to develop an empirical approach to assessing welfare under alternative
policy interventions (including the no intervention option).
Advantageous selection. The original theory of selection in insurance markets emphasized the
possibility of adverse selection, and the resultant e¢ ciency loss from under-insurance (Akerlof 1970;
Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). Consistent with this theory, the empirical evidence points to several
insurance markets, including health insurance and annuities, in which the insured have higher
average costs than the uninsured. However, a growing body of empirical evidence suggests that in
many other insurance markets, including life insurance and long-term care insurance, there exists
advantageous selection. Those with more insurance have lower average costs than those with
less or no insurance. Cutler, Finkelstein, and McGarry (2008) provide a review of the evidence of
adverse and advantageous selection in di¤erent insurance markets.
Our framework makes it easy to describe the nature and consequences of advantageous selection.
Figure II provides a graphical representation. In contrast to adverse selection, with advantageous
selection the individuals who value insurance the most are those who have, on average, the least
expected costs. This translates to upward sloping MC and AC curves. Once again, the source of
market ine¢ ciency is that consumers vary in their marginal cost, but rms are restricted to uniform
pricing, and in equilibrium price is based on average cost. However, with advantageous selection
the resultant market failure is one of over-insurance rather than under-insurance (i.e. Qeff < Qeqm
in Figure II), as was pointed out by de Meza and Webb (2001), among others. Intuitively, insurance
providers have an additional incentive to reduce price, as the infra-marginal customers whom they
acquire as a result are relatively good risks. The resultant welfare loss is given by the shaded area
CDE, and represents the excess of MC over willingness to pay for individuals whose willingness to
pay exceeds the average costs of the insured population. Once again, we can also easily evaluate
welfare of di¤erent situations in Figure II, including mandating contract H (the area ABE minus
the area EGH), mandating contract L (normalized to zero), competitive equilibrium (ABE minus
CDE), and e¢ cient allocation (ABE).
Su¢ cient statistics for welfare analysis. These graphical analyses illustrate that the demand
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and cost curves are su¢ cient statistics for welfare analysis of equilibrium and non-equilibrium
pricing of existing contracts. In other words, di¤erent underlying primitives (i.e. preferences and
private information as summarized by ) have the same welfare implications if they generate the
same demand and cost curves.9
This in turn is the essence of our empirical approach. We estimate the demand and cost curves,
but remain agnostic about the underlying primitives that give rise to them. As long as individuals
revealed choices can be used for welfare analysis, the precise source of selection is not germane
for analyzing the e¢ ciency consequences of the resultant selection, or the welfare consequences of
public policies that change the equilibrium price.
The key to any counterfactual analysis that uses the approach we propose is that insurance
contracts are taken as given, and only their prices vary. Thus, for example, the estimates gener-
ated by our approach can be used to analyze the e¤ect of a wide variety of standard government
interventions in insurance markets which change the price of insurance. These include mandatory
insurance coverage, taxes and subsidies for insurance, regulations that outlaw some of the existing
contracts, regulation of the allowable price level, or regulation of allowable pricing di¤erences across
observably di¤erent individuals. However, more structure and assumptions would be required if we
were to analyze the welfare e¤ects of introducing insurance contracts not observed in the data.
II.D. Incorporating moral hazard
Thus far we have not explicitly discussed any potential moral hazard e¤ect of insurance. This
is because moral hazard does not fundamentally change the analysis, but only complicates the
presentation. We illustrate this by rst discussing the baseline case in which we dene contract H
to be full coverage and contract L to be no coverage. Here, moral hazard has no e¤ect on the welfare
analysis. We then discuss the slight modication needed when we allow contract L to include some
partial coverage.
With moral hazard, the expected insurable cost for individual i is now a function of his contract
choice because coverage may a¤ect behavior. We therefore dene two (rather than one) expected
monetary costs for individual i. We denote by cH(i) individual is expected insurable costs under
contract H relative to contract L, when he behaves as if he is covered by contract H. Similarly, we
dene cL(i) to be individual is expected insurable costs under contract H relative to contract L,
when he behaves as if he is covered by contract L. That is, cj(i) always measures the incremental
insurable costs under contract H compared to contract L, while the superscript j denotes the
underlying behavior, which depends on coverage. We assume throughout that cH(i)  cL(i); this
inequality will be strict if and only if moral hazard exists. As a result, we now have two marginal
cost curves, MCH and MCL, and two corresponding average cost curves, ACH and ACL (with
MCH and ACH always higher than MCL and ACL, respectively).
9Note that we have placed no restrictions in Figures I or II on the nature of the underlying consumer primitives
i. Individuals may well di¤er on many unobserved dimensions concerning their information and preferences. Nor
have we placed any restriction on the nature of the correlation across these primitives.
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In contrast to the selection case, a social planner generally has no potential comparative advan-
tage over the private sector in ameliorating moral hazard (i.e. in encouraging individuals to choose
socially optimal behavior). Our welfare analysis of selection therefore takes any moral hazard ef-
fect as given. We investigate the welfare cost of the ine¢ cient pricing associated with selection or
the welfare consequences of particular public policy interventions given any existing moral hazard
e¤ects, just as we take as given other features of the environment that may a¤ect willingness to
pay or costs.
In order to explicitly recognize moral hazard in our foregoing equilibrium and welfare analysis
one can simply replace c(i) everywhere above with c
H(i), and obtain the same results. Recall, as
emphasized earlier, that the cost curve is dened based on the costs of individuals who endogenously
buy contract H (see equation (2)); in the new notation their costs are given by cH(i) since they are
covered by contract H (and behave accordingly). Thus, cL(i) is largely irrelevant. The intuition
from the rm perspective is clear: the insurers cost is only a¤ected by the behavior of insured
individuals, and not by what their behavior would be if they were not insured. From the consumer
side cL(i) does matter. However, it matters only because it is one of the components that a¤ect
the willingness to pay for insurance. As we showed already, willingness to pay () and cost to
the insurer (cH) are su¢ cient statistics for the equilibrium and welfare analysis. Both can be
estimated without knowledge of cL(i). Therefore, as long as moral hazard is taken as given, it
is inconsequential to break down the willingness to pay for insurance to a part that arises from
reduction in risk and a part that arises from a change in behavior.
The one substantive di¤erence once we allow for moral hazard is that the assumption that con-
tract L involves no coverage is no longer inconsequential. Once contract L involves some partial
coverage, it is no longer the case that all potential moral hazard e¤ects of contract H on insurable
expenditures are internalized by the provider of contract H through their impact on cH . To see this,
we rst note that when contract L involves some coverage, the market equilibrium could be thought
of as one in which rms o¤ering contract H only compete on the incremental coverage in excess of
L.10 Welfare analysis of the allocation of contract H must now account for the potential negative
externality that coverage by contract H inicts on the insurer providing contract L (through in-
creased cost). This conceptual point does not pose practical di¢ culties for our framework. With
estimates of the moral hazard e¤ect, the welfare gain of providing contract H to individual i is
simply smaller by the amount of the increased insurable costs for the provider of contract L that are
associated with the change of behavior. As we discuss in more detail in Section III, our approach
points to a natural way by which moral hazard can be estimated (and therefore incorporated into
the welfare analysis if needed, when contract L involves some partial coverage).
10One natural example is that of contract L as the public health insurance program Medicare and contract H as
the supplemental private Medigap insurance that covers some of the costs not covered by Medicare.
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III. Estimation
III.A. The basic framework
Applying our framework to estimating welfare in an insurance market requires data that allows
estimation of the demand curve D(p) and the average cost curve AC(p). The marginal cost curve
can be directly backed out from these two curves and does not require further estimation. To see
this, note that
MC(p) =
@TC(p)
@D(p)
=
@ (AC(p) D(p))
@D(p)
=

@D(p)
@p
 1 @ (AC(p) D(p))
@p
: (10)
With these three curves D(p), AC(p), and MC(p) in hand, we can straightforwardly compute
welfare under various allocations, as illustrated in Figures I and II.
As is standard, estimating the demand curve requires data on prices and quantities (i.e. coverage
choices), as well as identifying price variation that can be used to trace out the demand curve. This
price variation has to be exogenous to unobservable demand characteristics. To estimate the AC(p)
curve we need, in addition, data on the expected costs of those with contract H, such as data on
subsequent risk realization and how it translates to insurer costs. With such data we can then use
the same variation in prices to trace out the AC(p) curve. Because expected cost is likely to a¤ect
demand, any price variation that is exogenous to demand is also exogenous to insurable cost. That
is, we do not require a separate source of variation.
With su¢ cient price variation, no functional form assumptions are needed for the prices to
trace out the demand and average cost curves. For example, if the main objective is to estimate
the e¢ ciency cost of ine¢ cient pricing arising from selection, then price variation that spans the
range between the market equilibrium price (point C in Figures I and II) and the e¢ cient price
(point E) allows us to estimate the welfare cost of the ine¢ cient pricing associated with selection
(area CDE) without making any restrictions on the shape of the demand or average cost curves.
With pricing variation that does not span these points, the area CDE can still be estimated, but
will require some extrapolation based on functional form assumptions.
III.B. Extensions
As mentioned, the basic framework we described in Section II made a number of simplifying as-
sumptions for expositional purposes which do not limit the ability to apply this approach more
broadly. It is straightforward to apply the approach to the case where contract H provides less
than full coverage and/or where contract L provides some coverage. We discuss a specic example
of this in our application below. In such settings we must simply be clear that the cost curve of
interest is derived from the average incremental costs to the insurance company associated with
providing contract H rather than providing contract L. For the welfare analysis, we must also be
sure to incorporate any moral hazard e¤ects of contract H on the costs to the insurers providing
contract L. We discussed above conceptually how to adjust the welfare analysis; later in this section
we describe how to estimate the moral hazard e¤ect of contract H.
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Likewise, while it was simpler to present the graphical analysis with only two coverage options,
the approach naturally extends to more than two contracts. The data requirements would simply
extend to having price, quantity, and costs for each contract, as well as pricing variation across
all relevant relative prices, so that the entire demand and average cost systems can be estimated.
Specically, with N available contracts, one could normalize one of these contracts to be the
reference contract, dene incremental costs (and price) of each of the other contracts relative to the
reference contract, and estimate a system D(p) and AC(p), where demand, prices, and average costs
are now N 1 dimensional vectors. As in the two-contract case, competitive equilibrium (dened by
each contract breaking even) will be given by the vector of prices that solves p = AC(p). From the
estimated systemsD(p) and AC(p) one can also back out the system of marginal costsMC(p) which
denes the marginal costs associated with each price vector. We can then solve p =MC(p) for the
e¢ cient price vector and integrate D(p) MC(p) over the (multi-dimensional) di¤erence between
the competitive and the e¢ cient price vectors to obtain the welfare cost of the ine¢ cient pricing
associated with selection.11
Finally, we note that the estimated demand and cost curves are su¢ cient statistics for welfare
analysis of equilibrium allocations of existing contracts generated by models other than the one
we have sketched. This includes, for example, welfare analysis of other equilibria, such as those
generated by imperfect competition rather than our benchmark of perfect competition. It also
includes welfare analysis of markets with other production functions, which may include xed or
varying administrative costs of selling more coverage, rather than our benchmark of no additional
costs beyond insurable claims. This is because, as the discussion of estimation hopefully makes
clear, we do not use assumptions about the equilibrium or the production function to estimate
the demand and cost curves. An assumption of a di¤erent equilibrium simply requires calculation
of welfare relative to a di¤erent equilibrium point (point C in the graphs). Similarly, if one has
external information (or beliefs) about the nature of the production function, one can use this to
shift or rotate the estimated cost curve, and calculate the new equilibrium and e¢ cient points.
III.C. A direct test of selection
Although the primary focus of our paper is on estimating the welfare cost of ine¢ cient pricing
associated with selection, our proposed approach also provides a direct test for the existence and
nature of selection. This test is based on the slope of the estimated marginal cost curve. A
rejection of the null hypothesis of a constant marginal cost curve allows us to reject the null of
no selection.12 Moreover, the sign of the slope of the estimated marginal cost curve informs us of
11While conceptually straightforward, implementation of our approach with more than two contracts will likely
encounter, in practice, a number of subtle issues. For example, with multiple contracts the systems AC(p) = p
or MC(p) = p may have more scope for multiple or no solutions, and the denition of adverse selection or
advantageous selectionmay now be more subtle (see Einav, Finkelstein, and Levin (2010) for more discussion of
this latter point). In addition, from an empirical standpoint, estimating an entire demand and cost systems may be
more challenging (e.g., in terms of the variation required) than estimating one-dimensional demand and cost curves.
12Using the terminology we dened in Section II.B, a at marginal cost curve implies that the equilibrium outcome
is constrained e¢ cient. It does not however imply that the equilibrium is rst best. Finkelstein and McGarry (2006)
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the nature of any selection; a downward sloping marginal cost curve (i.e. a cost curve declining
in quantity and increasing in price) indicates adverse selection, while an upward sloping curve
indicates advantageous selection. This is a useful test, since detecting the existence of selection is
a necessary precursor to analysis of its welfare e¤ects.
Importantly, our cost curve test of selection is una¤ected by the existence (or lack thereof)
of moral hazard. This is a distinct improvement over the inuential bivariate probit (a.k.a.
positive correlation) test of Chiappori and Salanie (2000) which has been widely used in the
insurance literature. This test, which compares realized risks of individuals with more and less
insurance coverage, jointly tests for the existence of either selection or moral hazard (but not for
each separately). Identifying price variation which is not required for the positive correlation
test is the key to our distinct test for selection. It allows us to analyze how the risk characteristics
of the sample who selects a given insurance contract vary with the price of that contract.
To see why our cost curve test is not a¤ected by any potential moral hazard, note that the AC
curve is estimated using the sample of individuals who choose to buy contract H at a given price.
As we vary price we vary this sample, but everyone in the sample always has the same coverage.
Since by construction the coverage of individuals in the sample is xed, our estimate of the slope
of the cost curve (our test of selection) is not a¤ected by moral hazard (which determines how
costs are a¤ected as coverage changes). Of course, part of the selection reected in the slope of the
cost curve may reect selection based on di¤erences across individuals in the anticipated impact of
coverage on costs (i.e. the moral hazard e¤ect of coverage). We still view this as a selection e¤ect,
representing selection into contracts based on the anticipated incentive e¤ects of these contracts.
III.D. Estimating moral hazard
Our framework also allows us to test for and quantify moral hazard. One way to measure moral
hazard is by the di¤erence between cH(i) individual is expected insurable cost when he is covered
by contractH and cL(i) individual is expected insurable cost when he is covered by contract L.
That is, cH(i)  cL(i) is the moral hazard e¤ect from the insurers perspective, or the increased
cost to the insurer from providing contract H that is attributable to the change in behavior of
covered individuals. We already discussed how identifying price variation can be used to estimate
the AC and MC curves, which we denote by ACH and MCH when moral hazard is explicitly
recognized. With data on the costs of the uninsured (or less insured, if contract L represents some
partial coverage), we can repeat the same exercise to obtain an estimate for ACL and MCL. That
is, we can use the same identifying price variation to estimate demand for contract L and to estimate
the ACL curve from the (endogenously selected) sample of individuals who choose contract L. We
can then back out the MCL curve analogously to the way we back out the MCH curve, using of
course the demand curve for contract L and the ACL curve (rather than the demand for contract
H and the ACH curve) in translating average costs into marginal costs (see equation (10)). The
present evidence on an insurance market that may exhibit a at cost curve (no selection) but does not achieve the
rst best allocation.
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(point-by-point) vertical di¤erence between MCH and MCL curves provides an estimate of moral
hazard. A test of whether this di¤erence is positive is a direct test for moral hazard, which is valid
whether adverse selection is present or not.13
Of course, it is not a new observation that an exogenous shifter of insurance coverage (which in
our context comes from pricing) facilitates the estimation of moral hazard. However, our proposed
approach to estimating moral hazard (compared to, say, a more standard instrumental variable
framework) allows us to estimate (with su¢ ciently rich price variation) heterogeneous moral hazard
e¤ect and to see how moral hazard varies across individuals with di¤erent willingness to pay (i),
or di¤erent expected costs cH(i).
III.E. Applicability
In the next section we turn to a specic application of our proposed framework, which illustrates
the mechanics of the approach as well as produces results that may be of interest in their own right.
Here we discuss more generally the types of settings in which our approach might be applicable.
There are two main requirements that need to be met in order to sensibly use our approach.
First, it has to be feasible to credibly estimate the demand and cost curves. This requires both
data on insurance prices, quantities, and insurers costs, as well as identifying variation in prices.
The required data elements of insurance options and choices and subsequent risk realization are
not particularly stringent; researchers have already demonstrated considerable success in a wide
range of insurance markets in obtaining such data.14 Indeed, a nice feature of welfare analysis in
insurance markets is that cost data are much easier to obtain than in many other markets, since
they involve information on accident occurrences or insurance claims, rather than insight into the
underlying production function of the rm.
Finding identifying variation in prices is a considerably stronger empirical hurdle, although the
near-ubiquitous regulation of insurance markets provide numerous potential opportunities. Recall
that while our application below assumes that prices are set exogenously to unobservable demand
(and cost) characteristics, alternative research designs that isolate credible identifying variation,
such as an instrumental variable approach, would do. For example, state regulations of private
insurance markets have created variation in the prices charged to di¤erent individuals at a point in
time as well as over time (Blackmon and Zeckhauser 1991; Buchmueller and DiNardo 2002; Bundorf
and Simon 2006). Tax policy is another useful potential source of pricing variation. For example, a
large literature has documented (and used) the substantial variation in the tax subsidy for employer-
13The exercise we have just described would provide an estimate of the moral hazard e¤ect from the insurers
perspective. One might be interested in other measures of moral hazard, such as the e¤ect of insurance on total
spending rather than insurer costs. The test of moral hazard can be applied in the same manner using other
denitions of c(i): The same statement of course applies to our cost curve selection analysis; for the purpose of
analyzing equilibrium and market e¢ ciency, we have estimated selection from the insurer perspective, but again the
approach could be used to measure selection on any other outcome of interest.
14Examples include auto and homeowners insurance (Sydnor 2006; Cohen and Einav 2007; Barseghyan, Prince,
and Teitelbaum 2008), annuities (Finkelstein and Poterba 2004), long term care insurance (Finkelstein and McGarry
2006), health insurance (Eichner, McCLellan, and Wise 1998), and many others.
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provided health insurance (see Gruber (2002) for a review). Beyond the opportunities provided by
public policy, researchers have also found useful pricing variation stemming from eld experiments
(Karlan and Zinman 2009) and specic idiosyncrasies of rm pricing behavior.15 More generally,
common instruments used in demand analysis, such as changes in the competitive environment
(Lustig 2008) or perhaps shifters in the administrative costs of handling claims, could serve as the
requisite source for identifying price variation. The validity of this variation for identication is of
course a key issue, which can and should be evaluated in specic applications. Indeed, we see the
transparency of our approach in this regard as an important attraction.
The second key requirement for applying our proposed framework stems from its focus on
ine¢ cient pricing. Given that it is designed to estimate the welfare consequences from pricing of
existing contracts, it is best suited to settings in which the market or public policy response to
asymmetric information will primarily manifest itself through pricing of observed contracts rather
than other aspects of contract design. We note that a pricing response also covers the elimination
of certain contracts or mandating a specic (observed) contract, which is of course equivalent to
pricing a subset of the contracts at their virtual price,at which demand for these contracts is zero;
of course, credible applications in such settings would require price variation around the virtual
price, which may be more di¢ cult to nd. However, our approach cannot accommodate a market or
policy response that leads to the introduction of new contracts, which were not previously observed.
How closely a given setting ts this bill needs to be evaluated on a case by case. Perhaps the
ideal setting is one in which regulation (or some other constraint) explicitly prevents rms from
redesigning contracts. While rare, examples exist. One such case is the (limited) set of contracts
that can be o¤ered in the Medigap market, the private health insurance that supplements Medicare.
Since 1992, these contracts have been set by national regulation: private rms may decide which
of the specied contracts to o¤er and at what price, but they cannot design and introduce new
contracts (see, e.g., Fox, Rice, and Alecxih 1995). A related example is the application we discuss
below in which company headquarters design the coverage options and print the brochures that
describe them, while di¤erent subsidiaries are allowed (some) choice over the relative pricing of
these options.
A likely more common setting that doesnt quite t this ideal standard but may come su¢ ciently
close is the practice in many markets to rst settle on the contract design, and then adjust only
prices over time and across individuals. For example, the Medicare Part D market (for subsidized
prescription drug coverage for the elderly) divides the country into 34 geographical markets. Those
providers that operated in multiple markets (and most of them do) have designed and advertised a
single (national) set of coverage plans (in terms of formularies, deductible, cost sharing, etc.), and
only adjusted their prices by region (Keating 2007). Similarly, in annuity markets companies o¤er
identical sets of contracts (in terms of tilt of payments and guaranteed payment features), with
15Examples include rm experimentation with their pricing policy (Cohen and Einav 2007), discrete pricing policy
changes (Adams, Einav, and Levin 2009), idiosyncratic pricing decisions made by human resource managers (Cutler
and Reber 1998), and the non-linearities and discontinuities associated with rules rms use to risk adjust individuals
premiums (Abbring, Chiappori, and Pinquet 2003; Israel 2004).
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only the annuity rates varying with the annuitant mortality prole (Finkelstein and Poterba 2002).
IV. Empirical illustration: employer-provided health insurance
IV.A. Data and environment
We illustrate the approach we have just outlined using individual-level data from 2004 on the U.S.-
based employees (and their dependents) at Alcoa, Inc. The primary purpose of the application is
to show how the theoretical framework can be mapped into empirical welfare estimates. We view
the direct link between the theoretical framework and the empirical estimates and the resulting
transparency this provides for evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the empirical results 
as a key strength of our approach.
In 2004 Alcoa had approximately 45,000 active employees in the U.S. working at about 300
di¤erent job sites in 39 di¤erent states. At that time, in an e¤ort to control healthcare spending,
Alcoa introduced a new set of health insurance options to virtually all its salaried employees and
about one-half of its hourly employees. We analyze the choices and claims of employees o¤ered the
new set of options in 2004.16
The data contain the menu of health insurance options available to each employee, the employee
premium associated with each option, the employees coverage choice, and detailed claim-level
information on all his (and any covered dependents) medical expenditures during the coverage
period.17 Crucially, as we discuss below, the data contain plausibly exogenous variation in the
prices of the insurance contracts o¤ered to otherwise similar employees within the company. Finally,
the data contain rich demographic information, including the employees age, race, gender, annual
earnings, job tenure at the company, and the number and ages of other insured family members.
We suspect that we observe virtually everything about the employee that the administrators setting
insurance premiums can observe without direct personal contact, as well as some characteristics
that the price setters might not be able to observe (such as detailed medical expenditure information
from previous years; this information is administered by a third party). This is important because
it allows us to examine whether the variation in prices across employees appears correlated with
the employee characteristics that could potentially inuence the price settersdecisions.
We restrict our baseline analysis to a subsample of employees for whom the pricing variation is
cleaner and the setting follows more closely the theoretical framework. Our baseline sample consists
of 3,779 salaried employees with family coverage who chose one of the two modal health insurance
choices: a higher and a lower level of PPO coverage (we refer to these hereafter as contract H
and contract L and provide more details about them in Section IV.C below). The online appendix
16Over the subsequent several years, most of the remaining hourly employees were transitioned to the new health
insurance options as their union contracts expired. The variation over time in the contracts o¤ered is not well suited
to the approach developed here, which relies on variation in the pricing of the same set of contract o¤erings. Busch
et al. (2006) study the e¤ect of the change in plan options between 2003 and 2004 on the use of preventive care.
17Health insurance choices are made during the open enrollmentperiod at the end of 2003 and apply for all of
2004. We also observe medical expenditure in 2003 if the employee worked at the company for all of 2003.
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provides many more details about these sample restrictions, provides results for other coverage
tiers, and addresses concerns of sample selection.
IV.B. Variation in prices
Company structure as the source of variation. An essential element in the analysis is that there is
variation across employees in the relative price they face for contract H, and that this variation is
unrelated to the employeeswillingness to pay for contract H or to his insurable costs. We believe
that Alcoas business structure provides a credible source of such pricing variation across di¤erent
employees in the company.
In 2004, as part of the new benet design, company headquarters o¤ered a set of seven di¤erent
possible pricing menus for employee benets. The coverage options are the same across all the
menus, but the prices (employee premiums) associated with these options vary. For our purposes,
the key element of interest is the incremental (annual) premium the employee must pay for contract
H relative to contract L, p = pH   pL. We refer to this incremental premium as the price in
everything that follows. There were six di¤erent values of p in 2004 (as two of the seven menus
were identical in this respect), ranging (for family coverage) from $384 to $659.18
Which price menu a given employee faces is determined by the president of his business unit.
Alcoa is divided into approximately forty business units. Each business unit has essentially complete
independence to run their business in the manner they see t, provided that they do so ethically and
safely, and at or above the companys normal rate of return. Failure on any of these dimensions
can result in the replacement of the units president. Business units are typically organized by
functionality such as primary metals, exible packaging materials, rigid packaging materials, or
home exterior  and are independent of geography. There are often multiple business units in
the same state. The number of active employees in a business unit ranges from the low teens (in
government a¤airs) to close to 6,000 (in primary metals). The median business unit has about
500 active employees. The business unit president may choose di¤erent price menus for employees
within his unit based on their location (job site) and their employment type (salaried or hourly
employee and, if hourly, which union if at all the employee is in).
As a result of this business structure, employees doing the same job in the same location may face
di¤erent prices for their health insurance benets due to their business unit a¢ liation. A priori, it
struck us as more plausible that the pricing variation across salaried employees in di¤erent business
units is more likely to be useful for identication  reecting idiosyncratic characteristics of the
business unit presidents rather than di¤erences in the demand or costs of salaried employees in the
di¤erent business units than the pricing variation across hourly employees. This is because many
of the jobs that salaried employees do are quite similar across business units. Thus, for example,
18The annual pre-tax employee premium for contract H was around $1,500 for family coverage, although of course
it ranged across the di¤erent menus. The incidence of being o¤ered a menu with a lower average price level (across
di¤erent options) may well be passed on to employees in the form of lower wages (Gruber 1994). This is one additional
reason why it is preferable to focus the analysis on the di¤erence in premiums for the di¤erent coverage options, rather
than the level of premiums.
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accountants, paralegals, administrative assistants, electrical engineers, or metallurgists working in
the same state may face di¤erent prices because their benets were chosen by the president of the
rigid packagingbusiness unit, rather than by the president of primary metals.By comparison,
the nature of the hourly employeeswork (which often involves the operation of particular types
of machinery) is more likely to di¤er across di¤erent units, and may depend on what the business
unit is producing. For example, the work of the potroom operators stirring molten metal around
in large vats in the primary metals business unit is likely to be di¤erent from the work of the
furnace operators in the rigid packagingunit.
Examination of assumption of exogenous pricing. The available data appear consistent with this
basic intuition. Table I compares mean demographic characteristics of employees in our baseline
sample who face di¤erent prices. In general, the results look quite balanced. There is no sub-
stantive or statistically signicant di¤erence across employees who face di¤erent prices in average
age, fraction male, fraction white, average (log) wages, average age of spouse, number of covered
family members, or age of the youngest child. The two possible exceptions to this general pattern
are average job tenure and average 2003 medical expenditures (which we show both for all of our
sample who was working in 2003 and when restricted to employees in the most common plan in
2003, to avoid potential di¤erences in spending arising from moral hazard e¤ects of di¤erent 2003
coverages).19 A joint F   test of all of the coe¢ cients leaves us unable to reject the null that they
are jointly uncorrelated with price.20 Inference is similar when we include state xed e¤ects or
extend the sample to include all coverage tiers (rather than family coverage only) or all salaried
employees (rather than just the two-thirds who choose the two modal coverage options).
Ancillary support of the quantitative evidence we have just described comes from our qualitative
investigation into benet selection at Alcoa in 2004. Importantly, this was the rst year ever that
business unit presidents had the opportunity to make decisions regarding the relative prices of
insurance contracts for their employees. Therefore, while one might suspect that over time their
price selection might become more sophisticated with respect to demand or expected costs (which
would invalidate our identication assumption), in the rst year the decision makers had relatively
little information or experience to go by. Relatedly, the new benet system represented the rst
time in the companys history that it was possible to charge employees a substantial incremental
price for greater health insurance coverage. Our discussions with the company suggested that many
business unit presidents were (at least initially) philosophically opposed to charging employees much
for (generous) health insurance coverage, which may explain why (as we show below in Table II)
about three quarters of the salaried employees ended up facing the lowest possible incremental price
that the business unit presidents were allowed to choose. Perhaps because of this, after 2004 Alcoa
headquarters no longer gave the business unit presidents a choice on benet prices, and chose a
19We should note, of course, that when testing 10 di¤erent variables the p   value should be adjusted upward to
take account of the multiple hypothesis testing, so that the p  values we report are too small.
20When we examine the eight contemporaneous characteristics we obtain an F   stat of 1.71 (p   value = 0:14).
When we also include 2003 spending for those in the same plan as a ninth covariate (so that our sample size falls by
about 25 percent) we obtain an F   stat of 0.95 (p  value = 0:50).
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(uniform) pricing structure with a higher price than any of the options available in 2004.
Interestingly, the story looks very di¤erent for hourly employees. A similar analysis of covariates
for hourly employees suggests statistically signicant di¤erences across employees who face di¤erent
prices. As noted, this is not surprising given the institutional environment, and motivates our
sample restriction to salaried employees. Indeed, the fact that prices for hourly employees are not
uncorrelated with employee characteristics is somewhat reassuring; in a large for-prot company,
it makes sense to expect clear di¤erences in employee characteristics to be reected in the prices
chosen. It may be that when there was more at stake (in terms of cost di¤erences across employees)
the business unit presidents paid more attention to setting prices and less to their idiosyncratic
philosophical views. It is also possible although we have no direct evidence for this that the
business unit presidents had fundamentally di¤erent objectives in setting prices for hourly and for
salaried employees.
Thus, while we would of course prefer to be able to isolate the precise source of our pricing
variation, we are nonetheless reassured by both the quantitative and qualitative evidence that the
prices faced by salaried employees appear uncorrelated with their predictors of demand or costs.
Of course, we are able to only examine whether prices are correlated with observable di¤erences
across salaried employees. We cannot rule out potential unobservable di¤erences, for example in
the culture of the business unit, which could potentially a¤ect price setting and be correlated
with either demand or costs.
IV.C. Empirical strategy and relationship with the theoretical framework
As before, we denote by pi = pHi   pLi the relative price employee i faces, where pji is employee
is annual premium if she chose coverage j. We dene Di to be equal to 1 if employee i chooses
contract H and 0 if employee i chooses contract L. Finally, we let mi be a vector representing total
medical expenditures of employee i and any covered family members in 2004.
Coverage characteristics and construction of the cost variable. In our theoretical discussion in
Section II we dened (for simplicity) contractH to be full coverage and contract L to be no coverage.
As a result we could refer to ci as the total cost to the insurance company from covering employee i.
When contract H is not a full coverage and contract L provides some partial coverage, the relevant
cost variable (denoted ci) is dened as the incremental cost to the insurer from providing contractH
relative to providing contract L, holding mi xed. Specically, let c(mi;H) and c(mi;L) denote the
cost to the insurance company from medical expendituresmi under contracts H and L, respectively.
The incremental cost is then given by ci  c(mi) = c(mi;H) c(mi;L). The AC curve is computed
by calculating the average ci for all individuals who choose contract H at a given relative price p
(see equation (2)) and estimating how this average ci varies as the relative price varies. We can
observe c(mi;H) directly in the data, but c(mi;L) must be computed counterfactually using the
claims data and the coverage rules of contract L. For consistency, we calculate both c(mi;H) and
c(mi;L) from plan rules.
Construction of ci requires detailed knowledge of each plans benets as well as individuals
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realized medical claims. This allows us to construct the cost to the insurance company of insuring
medical expenditures mi under any particular plan j. The two contracts we focus on vary only
in their consumer cost-sharing rules. Specically, contract L coverage has higher deductibles and
higher out-of-pocket maximums.21 The data are quite detailed and the plan rules are fairly simple,
allowing us to calculate c(mi; j) with a great deal of accuracy. For example, for individuals with
contract H the correlation between their actual (observed) share of out-of-pocket spending (out
of total expenditure) and our constructed share is over 0.97. The online appendix provides more
detail on our calculation of ci:
Figure III presents the major di¤erences in consumer cost sharing between the two coverage
options. Cost sharing rules di¤er depending on whether spending is in-network or out-of-network.
Figure III(a) shows the annual out-of-pocket spending (on the vertical axis) associated with a given
level of total medical spending m (on the horizontal axis) for each coverage option, assuming the
medical spending is in-network. In network, contract H has no deductible while contract L has a
$500 deductible. Both contracts have a 10% coinsurance rate, and the out-of-pocket maximum is
$5,000 for contract H and $5,500 for contract L: Figure III(b) presents the analogous graph for
out-of-network spending, which has higher cost sharing requirements under both plans. Although
the vast majority of spending (96%) occurs in network, about 25% of the individuals in our baseline
sample le at least one claim out of network, making the out-of-network coverage an important
part of the analysis.22
Figures III(c) and III(d) show the implied di¤erence in out-of-pocket spending between con-
tracts H and L, for a given level of annual medical expendituremi. Figure IV presents the empirical
distribution of the constructed ci variable. The distribution of ci reects the various kinks in the
coverage plans presented in Figure III. The most visible example is that about two thirds of the indi-
viduals in our baseline sample have ci = 450. This represents individuals who had between $500 and
$50,000 in-network (total) medical expenditures and less than $500 out-of-network expenditures.23
The nature of the plan di¤erences is important for understanding the margin on which we
may detect selection (or moral hazard). Empirically, because only few people spend anywhere
close to the out-of-pocket maximum of either contract, the di¤erence in insurers cost between
the plans is primarily attributable to di¤erences in the deductible. In terms of selection, this
suggests that the di¤erences in the plans could matter for the insurance choice of anyone with
positive expected expenditures, and is increasing as expected expenditures increase. In terms of
moral hazard, this suggests that if individuals are forward looking and have perfect foresight then
di¤erences in behavior for people covered by the di¤erent plans should be limited to the small
21The plans are similar in all other features, such as the network denition and the benets covered. As a result, we
do not have to worry about di¤erences between contarcts H and L in plan features that might di¤er in unobservable
ways across employees (for example, di¤erences in providers, the relative network quality, and so forth).
22There is no interaction between the in-network and out-of-network coverages. Each deductible and out-of-pocket
maximum must be satised separately.
23Note also that, as emphasized by Figure IV, because our cost variable captures the incremental cost of increased
coverage (rather than total medical expenditures) it is not heavily inuenced by outliers (catastrophic expenditures).
Indeed, as shown in Figure III, plan rules essentially cap incremental costs at $1,500.
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percentage (9%) of employees who have total medical expenditures that are less than the contract
L deductible.
Baseline estimating equations. For our baseline specication, we estimate the demand and
average cost functions using OLS, assuming that the demand and cost curves are each linear in
prices. That is, we estimate the following two equations
Di = + pi + i (11)
ci =  + pi + ui (12)
where, as described earlier, Di is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if employee i chose contract H
and equal to 0 if i chose contract L, ci is the realized incremental cost to the insurer from covering
individual i with contract H rather than contract L (see the online appendix for mode details on
the construction of ci), and pi is the incremental annual premium that employee i is required to pay
to purchase contract H (rather than contract L). In all regressions, we adjust the standard errors
to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix within each state. This is to allow for potential
correlation in the residuals of the demand or cost equations across salaried employees in the same
state. Following the theoretical framework, the demand equation is estimated on the entire sample,
while the (average) cost equation is estimated on the sample of individuals who (endogenously)
choose contract H.
Using the point estimates from the above regressions, we can construct our predicted demand
and average cost curves and other estimates of interest. Following equation (10), the marginal cost
curve is given by
MC(p) =
1


@ (+ p) ( + p)
@p

=
1

( +  + 2p) =


+  + 2p: (13)
With the demand curve, AC curve, and MC curve in hand, we can nd where they intersect and
compute any area of interest between them. In our baseline (linear) specication, the intersection
points and areas of interest can be computed using simple geometry. The equilibrium price and
quantity are given by equating AC(p) = D(p), resulting in Peq =

1  and Qeq =  + 

1  : The
e¢ cient price and quantity are given by equatingMC(p) = D(p), resulting in Peff = 11 2


 + 

and Qeff = + 11 2 ( + ). The e¢ ciency cost associated with competitive pricing (measured
by the area of triangle CDE in Figure I) is then given by
CDE =
1
2
(Qeff  Qeq) (Peq  MC(Peq)) =  
2
2 (1  2)

+

1  
2
: (14)
In the online appendix we also report results from other, non-linear, specications, in which we
compute these price, quantity, and welfare estimates numerically.
IV.D. Baseline results
Our baseline specication estimates the linear demand and cost curves shown in equations (11) and
(12) on our baseline sample. This allows us to walk through the main conceptual points of interest
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involved in applying our proposed approach. In the online appendix we provide a more thorough
and detailed discussion of empirical issues specic to our context, including alternative samples and
specications.
Table II shows the raw data for our key variables. The (relative) price ranges from $384 to
$659, with about three-quarters of the sample facing the lowest price. Column (3) shows that the
propensity to choose contract H is generally declining with price, and ranges from 0.67 to 0.43.
Column (4) shows that the average costs of the (endogenously selected) individuals who select
contract H is generally increasing with price (or equivalently, declining in quantity). This pattern
of average costs indicates the existence of adverse selection (see Figure I). Column (5) shows the
same for the individuals who (endogenously) select contract L. Recall that incremental cost is
dened as the di¤erence in costs to the insurer associated with a given employees familys medical
expenditures if those expenditures were insured under contract H rather than contract L. As shown
in Figure III, this di¤erence is a non-linear function of expenditures.
In the spirit of the positive correlation test (Chiappori and Salanie 2000), a comparison of
columns (5) and (4) reveals consistently higher average costs for those covered by contract H
compared to those covered by contract L. This indicates that either moral hazard or adverse
selection is present. Detecting whether selection is present, and if so what its welfare consequences
are, requires the use of our pricing variation, to which we now turn.
In column (1) of Table III we report OLS estimates of equation (11) with no additional controls.
We obtain a downward sloping demand curve, with a (statistically signicant) slope coe¢ cient 
of -0.00070. This implies that a $100 increase in price reduces the probability that the employee
chooses contract H by a statistically signicant 7 percentage points, or about 11%.
In column (2) of Table III we use OLS to separately estimate the average cost curve in equation
(12). We obtain a (statistically signicant) slope coe¢ cient  of 0.155. As noted, the slope of the
cost curve represents a test for the existence and nature of selection, and the positive coe¢ cient
on price indicates the presence of adverse selection. That is, the average cost of individuals who
purchased contract H is higher when the price is higher. In other words, when the price selects
those who have, on average, higher willingness to pay for contract H, the average costs of this group
are also higher. The average cost curve is therefore downward sloping (in quantity, as in Figure I).
The point estimate from our baseline specication suggests that a dollar increase in the relative
price of contract H is associated with an increase in the average cost of the (endogenous) sample
selecting contract H at that price of about 16 cents. By itself, this estimate of the cost curve
can only provide evidence of the existence of adverse selection. Without knowledge of the demand
curve, it does not allow us to form even an approximate guess of the associated e¢ ciency cost of
adverse selection. A central theme of this paper is that we can combine the estimates from the
demand curve and the cost curve to move beyond detecting selection to quantifying its e¢ ciency
cost and, relatedly, to calculating the welfare benets from a set of public policy interventions.24
24As noted in Section II.D, when contract L involves partial coverage, welfare analysis would need to account for
the (negative) externalities associated with any moral hazard e¤ects. Our analysis here does not account for such
e¤ects since, as we show and discuss in the online appendix, we are unable to reject the null of no moral hazard in
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In this spirit, Figure V shows how to translate the baseline empirical estimates of the demand
and cost curves into the theoretical welfare analysis. That is, Figure V presents the empirical analog
to Figure I by plotting the estimated demand and average cost curves, as well as the marginal cost
curve implied by them (see equation (13)). Based on these estimates, it is straightforward to
calculate several quantities of interest (see Panel B of Table III), including the implied welfare cost
of competitive pricing, i.e. area CDE in Figure V (and Figure I). It should be readily apparent
from the gure that, holding the cost curve constant, shifting and/or rotating the demand curve
could generate very di¤erent welfare costs. This underscores the observation that merely estimating
the slope of the cost curve is not by itself informative about the likely magnitude of the resultant
ine¢ ciency.
We estimate that the welfare cost associated with competitive pricing is $9.55 per employee per
year, with a 95% condence interval ranging from $1 to $40 per employee.25 Adverse selection raises
the equilibrium price by almost $200 above the e¢ cient price (compare the estimated e¢ cient price
at point E to the estimated equilibrium price at point C), and correspondingly lowers the share of
contract H by 14 percentage points. The social benet of providing contract H to the marginal
employee who buys contract L in equilibrium (i.e. the vertical distance between points C and D in
Figure V) is $138.
Figure V also provides some useful information about the t of our estimates, and where our
pricing variation is relative to the key prices of interest for welfare analysis. The circles super-
imposed on the gure represent the actual data points (from Table II), with the size of each circle
proportional to the number of individuals who faced that price. The t of the cost curve appears
quite good. The t of the demand curve is also reasonable, although the scatter of data points led
us to assess the sensitivity of the results to a concave demand curve, which is one of the exercises
reported in the online appendix. The price range of $384 to $659 in our data brackets our estimate
of the equilibrium price (point C) of $463. The lowest (and modal) price in our sample of $384 is
about 45% higher than our estimate of the e¢ cient price (point E) of $264. Thus, while in principle
our approach does not require parametric assumptions, in practice the span of the pricing variation
in our particular application requires that we impose some functional form assumptions to estimate
the area of triangle CDE. In the online appendix we examine alternative functional forms.
IV.E. Welfare analyses
We show how our framework can be used to produce a number of other welfare estimates. These
may be of interest in their own right and also serve as useful comparisons to our baseline estimate
of the welfare cost of ine¢ cient pricing arising from adverse selection (triangle CDE).
Benchmarks for our welfare cost estimates. We can use the demand and cost curves shown
our specic application.
25We computed this condence interval using non-parametric bootstrap. That is, we draw 1,000 bootstrapped
samples, and repeated our baseline analysis in each sample. The 95% condence interval is given by the 2.5th and
97.5th percentiles in the distribution of welfare cost estimates.
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in Figure V to calculate various benchmarks that provide some context for our estimate of the
welfare cost of competitive pricing of $9.55 per employee. An important consideration in choosing
a benchmark is how out of sample we must take the demand and cost estimates in order to form
it. Again, Figure V is informative on this point.
We calculate two useful denominators to scale our estimate of the welfare cost. One is a measure
of how large this cost could have been before we started the analysis. Our thought experiment is
to assume that we observe data (on price, quantity, and costs) from only one of the rows of Table
II, so there is no price variation. We assume we observe the weighted average price of $414. Since
individuals have the option to buy contract H at this price but choose not to do so, their welfare
loss from not being covered by contract H cannot exceed $414. Our estimate of the e¢ ciency cost
of $9.55 is therefore 2.3% of this maximum money at stake,as Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf
(2009) term this construct.
A second useful denominator is to scale the welfare cost from competitive pricing arising from
adverse selection by the total surplus at stake from e¢ cient pricing. We therefore calculate the ratio
of triangle CDE (the welfare loss from competitive pricing) to triangle ABE (the total welfare from
e¢ cient pricing) in Figure I. To enhance readability, points A and B are not shown in Figure V, but
are easily calculated from the parameter estimates. They are, however, fairly out of sample relative
to our data. For example, at point A we estimate price to be about $1,350, which is more than twice
the highest price we observe in the data. In our particular application therefore, this benchmark
raises concerns about extrapolating too far out of sample, although we show in the online appendix
that the result is relatively robust to alternative functional forms for that extrapolation) Using this
benchmark as a denominator, we estimate that the welfare loss from adverse selection is about 3%
of the surplus at stake from e¢ cient pricing.
Welfare under other market allocations. Although our welfare analysis has focused on the
e¢ ciency cost of competitive equilibrium pricing arising from adverse selection, the fact that we
observe prices varying and this is how we identify the demand and cost curves underscores the
point that to generate our pricing variation we observed a market that is not in equilibrium. Our
analysis of equilibriumpricing , like our analysis of e¢ cientpricing, is based on a counterfactual.
By the same token, our analysis of the e¢ ciency cost of such pricing is not an analysis of the realized
e¢ ciency cost for our sample but rather what this e¢ ciency cost would be if, contrary to fact, these
options were o¤ered in a competitive market setting. Since our demand and cost curves are su¢ cient
statistics for welfare analysis of the pricing of existing contracts, we can use them to compute the
welfare cost of any other ine¢ cient pricing. For example, we estimate that the weighted average of
the welfare cost of adverse selection given the observed pricing in our sample (see Table II, columns
(1) and (2)) is $6.26 per employee per year.
Moreover, as we noted in Section II, we could also use the estimated demand and cost curves to
estimate welfare under alternative assumptions about the market equilibrium, including monopoly
or imperfect competition. For example, a monopolist facing our estimated demand and cost curves
would set a (relative) price of $907 for contract H. The resultant e¢ ciency cost would be just
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below $100 per employee, which is an order of magnitude higher than the estimated e¢ ciency cost
from competitive pricing.
Another interesting alternative is to compute what the welfare cost of competitive pricing would
be if, contrary to what happens in the employment context, competitive prices were set based on
some observable characteristics of the employees. To do so, we simply estimate the demand and
cost curves separately for each cellof individuals who, based on their characteristics, would be
o¤ered the same price. As an example, we consider what would happen to our welfare estimate
if prices were set di¤erently based on whether the family coverage applied to 3 individuals, 4
individuals, or 5 or more individuals. About half of our baseline sample has 4 covered members,
and the remaining sample is evenly split between the other two categories. We maintain the
assumption that the equilibrium would involve average cost pricing, although now the equilibrium
is determined separately in each of the three market segments. We detect adverse selection in each
segment separately, and estimate that the (weighted average) welfare cost of this selection would
be $12.92 if prices were set di¤erently for each market segment, compared to our estimated welfare
cost of $9.55 when family size is not priced.
Welfare consequences of government intervention. Adverse selection provides the textbook
economic rationale for government intervention in insurance markets. We therefore show how
we can use our framework to estimate the welfare cost of standard public policy interventions in
insurance markets. We then compare this to our estimate of the welfare cost of competitive pricing.
As mentioned, our approach allows us to analyze the welfare consequences of counterfactual public
policies that change the price of existing contracts, such as price subsidies, coverage mandates, and
regulation of the characteristics of individuals that can be used in pricing. This last potential policy
was already discussed in the previous section where we analyzed the welfare consequences of rms
pricing on a characteristic (in our example, family size) that is not currently priced.
Our preferred policy analysis in our particular application is to compare the social welfare gain
from e¢ cient pricing (triangle CDE) to the social welfare cost of the price subsidy required to
achieve this e¢ cient price. An attraction of this calculation is that it does not require further out
of sample extrapolation beyond what is needed to compute the area of triangle CDE itself. The
social cost of such a subsidy is given by (Peqm Peff )Qeff where  is the marginal cost of public
funds. Given our estimates of the e¢ cient and equilibrium outcomes (Figure V), and using 0.3
as the (standard estimate of) marginal cost of public funds (e.g., Poterba 1996), we calculate the
social cost of the price subsidy needed to achieve the e¢ cient allocation to be $45. That is, we
estimate that the social cost of a price subsidy that achieves the e¢ cient allocation is about ve
time larger than the social welfare (of $9.55) it gains.
Of course, given a non-zero social cost of public funds, the welfare maximizing subsidy would
not attempt to achieve the e¢ cient allocation. It is therefore also interesting to investigate whether
there is any scope for welfare improving government intervention in the form of a price subsidy
to contract H. We do this by investigating whether, at the competitive allocation (point C), a
marginal dollar of subsidy is welfare enhancing. We calculate that in our application it is not, so
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that the welfare maximizing (additional) price subsidy by the government is therefore zero.26
We also compared welfare in the competitive equilibrium with adverse selection to welfare when
everyone is mandated to be covered by contract H. Mandatory insurance is the canonical solution
to the problem of adverse selection in insurance markets (Akerlof 1970), making the analysis of
the mandate of considerable interest.27 However, in our application, the welfare cost of mandating
coverage by contract H (area EGH in Figure I) requires calculating points which are reasonably far
out of sample. This suggests that in our particular application more caution is warranted with this
analysis (although again we show in the online appendix that the estimate is reasonably robust).
With this important caveat in mind, we estimate that the welfare cost from mandatory coverage by
contract H is about three times higher than the welfare cost associated with competitive pricing.
V. Conclusions
This paper proposed a simple approach to quantifying and estimating the welfare cost caused
by ine¢ cient pricing in insurance markets with selection. We show how standard consumer and
producer theory can be applied to welfare analysis of such markets, and we provide a graphical
representation of the e¢ ciency cost of competitive pricing. This graphical analysis not only provides
helpful intuition but also suggests a straightforward empirical approach to welfare analysis. The
key to estimation is the existence of identifying variation in the price of insurance. Applied welfare
analysis usually requires pricing variation that allows the researcher to trace out a demand curve.
The dening feature of selection markets is that costs vary endogenously as market participants
respond to price. Welfare analysis in such markets therefore requires that we also trace out the
(endogenous) cost curve. We show that this is straightforward to do using direct data on cost and
the same price variation used to identify demand. In doing so, the slope of the estimated cost curve
also provides a direct test of the existence and nature of selection.
We illustrated our framework by applying it in the context of employer-provided health insurance
at a particular rm. We nd evidence of adverse selection in the market, but we estimate that the
welfare cost of the resultant ine¢ cient pricing is quantitatively small. It is important to emphasize
that our empirical estimates are specic to our particular setting and there is no reason to think
that our welfare estimates are representative of other populations, other institutional environments,
or other insurance markets. However, at a broader level, our ndings illustrate that it is empirically
possible to nd markets in which adverse selection exists and impairs market e¢ ciency, but where
the e¢ ciency cost of the pricing it produces may not be large, or obviously remediable using standard
public policy tools. Whether the same is true in other markets and in which is an important area
26The marginal benet from the rst dollar of subsidy is $137.4 (the distance between point C and point E) times
the marginal number of newly covered individuals (0.0007 given our estimates of the demand curve). By contrast,
the marginal cost of the dollar subsidy is the cost of public funds (0.3) times all of the inframarginal individuals at
point C (i.e. 0.617).
27Footnote 5 discussed some of the possible factors that may make it ine¢ cient to allocate the H contract to the
entire market.
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for future work.
We hope that such future work will apply our framework and strategy to other insurance settings
(or, more generally, to other settings with hidden information such as credit markets or regulated
monopolists). The approach is relatively straightforward to implement and fairly general. As a
result, comparisons of welfare estimates obtained by this approach across di¤erent settings may be
informative. In any given application, we see the transparency of our approach as one of its key
attractions. The direct mapping from the theoretical framework (Figure I) to its empirical analog
(Figure V) facilitates an informed appraisal of the estimates, including such issues as in-sample t,
the extent of out-of-sample extrapolation needed for a particular welfare estimate, and the extent
and validity of the pricing variation.
As we emphasize throughout, our approach is unable to shed light on the welfare consequences
of any distortion in the contract space induced by selection, or of public policies that introduce
contracts not observed in the data. Analysis of such questions would require a model of the
primitives underlying the revealed demand and cost curves. We view such models as a useful and
important complement to the empirical approach we have proposed here.
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Figure I: E¢ ciency cost of adverse selection
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This gure represents the theoretical e¢ ciency cost of adverse selection. It depicts a situation of adverse selection
because the marginal cost curve is downward sloping (i.e. increasing in price, decreasing in quantity), indicating that
the people who have the highest willingness to pay also have the highest expected cost to the insurer. Competitive
equilibrium is given by point C (where the demand curves intersects the average cost curve), while the e¢ cient
allocation is given by point E (where the demand curve intersects the marginal cost curve). The (shaded) triangle
CDE represents the welfare cost from under-insurance due to adverse selection.
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Figure II: E¢ ciency cost of advantageous selection
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This gure represents the theoretical e¢ ciency cost of advantageous selection. It depicts a situation of advantageous
selection because the marginal cost curve is upward sloping, indicating that the people who have the highest willingness
to pay have the lowest expected cost to the insurer. Competitive equilibrium is given by point C (where the demand
curve intersects the average cost curve), while the e¢ cient allocation is given by point E (where the demand curve
intersects the marginal cost curve). The (shaded) triangle CDE represents the welfare cost from over-insurance due
to advantageous selection.
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Figure III: Description of contract H and contract L
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Figure III(b)
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Figures III(a) and III(b) present the main features of contract H (dashed) and contract L (solid) family coverages
o¤ered by the company, which is based on a deductible and an out-of-pocket maximum. Figures III(c) and III(d)
present the corresponding cost di¤erence to the insurer by providing the contractH instead of contract L, for a given
level of medical expenditure. In other words, Figures III(c) and III(d) illustrate the in-network and out-of-network
components of the constructed variable ci(m): Figures III(a) and III(c) describe the rules for in-network medical
spending (deductibles of $0 and $500, and out-of-pocket maximums of $5,000 and $5,500 for contracts H and L,
respectively), and Figures III(b) and III(d) describe the rules for out-of-network medical spending (deductibles of $500
and $1000, and out-of-pocket maximums of $10,000 and $11,000 for contracts H and L, respectively). Coinsurance
rates for both contracts are 10% (in network) and 30% (out of network). There is no interaction between the in-
network and out-of-network coverages (i.e. each deductible and out-of-pocket maximum must be satised separately).
The online appendix provides more details on the coverage rules and our construction of ci(m).
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Figure IV: The distribution of the insurers incremental costs (ci)
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This gure presents the distribution of the incremental insurer cost (ci) for all 3,779 employees in our baseline sample.
Note that the distribution has several mass points which are driven by the kinked formula of the coverages (Figure
III). The largest mass point is at $450, with about two thirds of the sample. This point represents individuals who
spent more than $500 and less than $50,000 in network, and less than $500 out of network.
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Figure V: E¢ ciency cost of adverse selection - empirical analog
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This gure is the empirical analog of the theoretical Figure I. The demand curve and AC curve are graphed using the
point estimates of our baseline specication reported in the text. The MC curve is implied by the other two curves,
as in equation (13). The circles represent the actual data points (Table II) for demand (empty circles) and cost (lled
circles). The size of each circle is proportional to the number of individuals associated with it. For readability we
omit the one data point from Table II with only 7 observations (although it is included in the estimation). We label
points C, D, and E, that correspond to the theoretical analog in Figure I, and report some important implied point
estimates (of the equilibrium and e¢ cient points, as well as the welfare cost of adverse selection).
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Table I: Assessing the exogeneity of the price variation
Faced lowest
relative price
Faced higher
relative prices Difference Coefficient p-value
(2,939 employees) (840 employees)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age (Mean) 42.74 42.40 0.33 -0.245 0.31
Tenure (Mean) 13.02 11.63 1.39 -0.565 0.08
Fraction Male 0.862 0.852 0.009 1.268 0.79
Fraction White 0.874 0.825 0.049 -6.998 0.40
Log(Annual Salary) (Mean) 11.16 11.05 0.11 -8.612 0.17
Spouse Age (Mean) 41.37 41.05 0.32 -0.200 0.41
Number of covered family members (Mean) 4.14 4.07 0.07 -1.400 0.36
Age of youngest covered child (Mean) 9.81 9.41 0.40 -0.3 0.26
2003 Medical Spending (in $US)a
      All (Mean) 7,027 5,922 1,105 -0.0001 0.09
      In most common 2003 plan (Mean) 6,938 5,967 971 -0.0001 0.10
The table reports average di¤erences in covariates (shown in the left column) across employees who face di¤erent
relative prices for the higher coverage option in the baseline sample. The employee characteristics in the left column
represent contemporaneous 2004 characteristics (except where noted). Note that everyone with family coverage has
a covered spouse and at least one covered child. Columns (1) and (2) present, respectively, average characteristics
for the approximately three-quarters of employees who faced the lowest relative price ($384; see Table II) and the
remaining one quarter who face one of the ve higher relative prices ($466 to $659; see Table II). Column (3) shows
the di¤erence between columns (1) and (2). Columns (4) and (5) report, respectively, the coe¢ cient and p-value
from a regression of the (continuous) relative price variable (in $US) on the characteristic given in the left column;
we adjust the standard errors for an arbitrary variance covariance matrix within each state.
a In the bottom two rows we look at 2003 medical spending for all employees in the sample who were in the data in
2003 (2,600 and 658 employees in columns (1) and (2), respectively), and for all employees who were in the data in
2003 in the most common 2003 health insurance plan (2,282 and 523 employees in columns (1) and (2), respectively).
The latter attempts to avoid potential di¤erences in spending arising from moral hazard e¤ects of di¤erent 2003
coverages.
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Table II: The e¤ect of price on demand and costs
Contract H Contract L
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
$384 2,939 0.67 $451.40 $425.48
$466 67 0.66 $499.32 $423.30
$489 7 0.43 $661.27 $517.00
$495 526 0.64 $458.60 $421.42
$570 199 0.46 $492.59 $438.83
$659 41 0.49 $489.05 $448.50
Average incremental cost for
those covered under:Fraction chose
contract H
Number of
employees
(Relative)
Price
The table presents the raw data underlying our baseline estimates. All individuals face one of six di¤erent (relative)
prices, each represented by a row in the table. Column (2) reports the number of employees facing each price, and
column (3) reports the fraction of them who chose contract H . Columns (4) and (5) report (for individuals covered
by contracts H and L, respectively) the average incremental costs to the insurer of covering these individuals with
contract H rather than with contract L, taking the familys medical expenditures as given. The graphical analog to
this table is presented by the circles shown in Figure V.
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Table III: Estimation results
Panel A: Estimation results
Dependent Variable 1 if chose High Incremental Cost
(Sample) (both High and Low) (only High)
(1) (2)
Relative Price of High ($US) -0.00070 0.15524
(0.00032) (0.06388)
[0.034] [0.021]
Constant 0.940 391.690
(0.123) (26.789)
[0.000] [0.000]
Mean Dependent Variable 0.652 455.341
Number of Observations 3,779 2,465
R-Squared 0.008 0.005
Panel B: Implied quantities of interest
Competitive outcome (point C in Figure I) Q=0.617, P=463.5
Efficient outcome (point E in Figure I) Q=0.756, P=263.9
Efficiency cost from selection (triangle CDE) 9.55
Total surplus from efficient allocation (triangle ABE) 283.39
Efficiency cost from mandating contract H  (triangle EGH) 29.46
The table reports the results from our baseline specication. Sample is limited to salaried employees with family
coverage. Column (1) of Panel A reports the results from estimating the linear demand D = + p (equation
(11)) on the sample of employees who choose contract H or contract L; D is an indicator variable for whether the
employee chose contractH (as opposed to contract L). Column (2) reports the results from estimating the linear cost
equation c =  + p (equation (12)) on the sample of individuals who choose contract H ; c is the incremental costs
to the insurer of covering a given employees (and covered dependents) medical expenditures with contract H rather
than contract L. The price variable (p) is the incremental premium to the employee for contract H (as opposed
to contract L). There are no other covariates in the regression besides those shown in the table. All estimates are
generated by OLS. Standard errors (in parentheses) allow for an arbitrary variance covariance matrix within each
state; p values are in [square brackets]. Results from alternative specications are reported in the online appendix.
Panel B reports the point estimates of several quantities of interest that are derived from the baseline specication
and the estimates reported in Panel A.
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Online Appendix
Estimating welfare in insurance markets using variation in pricesby
Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen
A.1. Data construction
Construction of the baseline sample. We make a number of sample restrictions. First, we make
a number of restrictions for purposes of data purity, which brings the original sample of about
45,000 active employees down to about 37,000 active employees. The biggest reduction in sample
size comes from excluding employees who are not at the company for the entire year (for whom we
do not observe complete annual medical expenditures, which are necessary for estimating the cost
curve). In addition, we exclude employees who are outside the traditional benet structure of the
company (for example, because they were working for a recently acquired company with a di¤erent
(grandfathered) benet structure). For such employees we do not have detailed information on their
insurance options and choices. We also exclude a small number of employees because of missing
data or data discrepancies.
Second, because the new set of health insurance options we study did not apply to many hourly
employees and because (as we discuss in Section IV.B) the pricing variation is cleaner for the salaried
employees, we further limit the analysis in this paper to salaried employees, who are approximately
one third of the U.S.-based Alcoa workforce.
Third, to illustrate most easily how the theoretical framework maps to the empirical strategy,
we limit the baseline analysis to the two modal health insurance choices: a higher and a lower level
of PPO coverage, to which we refer as contract H and contract L throughout Section IV of the
paper. Approximately two-thirds of salaried employees chose one of these two PPO options. In
Section A.2 of this online appendix we describe the other options in more detail and show that the
pricing of the two PPO options we focus on does not a¤ect the probability of the employee choosing
one of the other options we do not analyze. This helps to alleviate concerns about potential biases
from our sample selection on contract choice.
Finally, for simplicity, our baseline specication further limits our sample of salaried employees
who choose either contract H or contract L to the slightly over one half of such employees who
choose the most common coverage tier, which is family coverage. All employees have a choice of
four di¤erent tiers for health insurance coverage: employee only, employee plus spouse, employee
plus children, and family coverage. In Section A.2 of this online appendix we show that our results
are similar when we include employees in all coverage tiers. We assume throughout that the choice
of coverage tier is unrelated to the pricing variation. A priori, this seems a reasonable assumption
given that coverage tier options are limited by the demographic composition of the family, and
that the price multiplier across coverage tiers is the same for all employees.1 Consistent with our
1Specically, for any health insurance coverage option, for all employees the family price is always triple the
1
assumption, we nd that the (relative) price of contract H in the family coverage tier does not
predict (either economically or statistically) which coverage tier the employee chooses (not shown).
Table A1 provides some descriptive statistics on the employees. Column (1) presents descriptive
statistics for the sample of 37,000 active employees for whom we have complete data. Column
(2) limits the sample to the approximately one third of the sample who are salaried employees.
Column (3) makes the further (minimal) restriction to the salaried employees who face the new
benet design. Column (4) further limits the sample to employees who choose either contract H
or contract L, and column (5) further limits the sample to those in family coverage. Column (5)
represents our baseline sample that we use for most of the empirical analysis. Section A.2 of this
online appendix presents analyses that use all coverage tiers (column (4)) and all coverage options
(column (3)).
For comparison, columns (6) through (8) of Table A1 present statistics from the 2005 March
Current Population Survey (CPS) on characteristics of various types of full-time employees in the
U.S. The principal (and unsurprising) nding is that Alcoa employees do not appear to be represen-
tative of any cut of full time employees in the U.S. We also compared the medical expenditures in
our baseline sample to medical expenditure data from the 2004 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(MEPS). Salaried employees in Alcoa tend to have about 50 percent lower medical expenditures
than comparable individuals in the MEPS.2 This may be because Alcoa salaried employees are
healthier than the general population or that they tend to live in regions with lower healthcare
costs.3 Such comparisons underscore our statements that our empirical results should be viewed as
an illustrative example of how our proposed approach can be applied, rather than as generalizable
ndings about the employer-provided health insurance market in the U.S.
Construction of incremental costs. One of the key variables in our analysis is the insurers
incremental costs ci. This is dened as c(mi;H)  c(mi;L), where c(mi; j) is the cost to the insurer
from covering medical expenditures mi under contract j. We note that medical utilization (mi) is
held xed in the construction of ci, so there is no estimation involved in the process.
The construction of ci requires detailed knowledge of each plans benets as well as individuals
realized medical claims. We obtained the former from reading each plan coverage details and
verifying them with the actual reimbursements we observe in the data. The latter is part of our
data, which include detailed information about every single claim made by Alcoa employees during
2004. For each claim we know the claim date, the claim amount, how much of it was reimbursed
by Alcoa, and how much was paid out of the insureds pocket. For the latter we also know whether
it was applied to the annual deductible or was part of a coinsurance. We also know whether each
employee only price, 1.58 times the employee plus children price, and 1.43 times the employee plus spouse
price.
2Specically we focus on MEPS observations on individuals with full-year coverage by employer-provided health
insurance, and we try to reweight observations to adjust for age and gender.
3 In addition to the non-representativeness of health expenditures in our Alcoa population, we further note that
our cost variable is a complicated non-linear transformation of total cost, which is perhaps even more context-specic
(as the transformation depends on the particular features of the plans we study).
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claim was associated with in-network or out-of-network care, and additional medical details which
are less relevant for the construction of ci.
To construct ci we simply run the observed set of claims for each covered employee (and
his dependents) through the reimbursement rules twice. Once by applying the rules of contract
H and once by applying the rules of contract L. A key feature of our setting which facilitates
this construction is that the two contracts we focus on vary only in their employee cost-sharing
rules. Alcoa is the direct insurer of both plans, and the plans are identical in all other features,
such as the network denition and the benets covered. As a result, we do not have to worry
about di¤erences between contracts H and L in plan features that might di¤er in unobservable
ways across employees (for example, di¤erences in providers or provider prices, the relative network
quality, and so forth). In particular, this implies that a set of claims submitted under one contract
would be eligible (and identical) claims under the other contract. Once we have runthe claims
for each employee for each contract, we have obtained c(mi;H) and c(mi;L), and the di¤erence is
our constructed variable ci.
Applying the plansrules is fairly simple, although certain issues require some care. One such
issue is whether a claim was made in network or out of network, since di¤erent deductible and cost
sharing rules would apply (see Figure III). A second issue is related to preventive care. Alcoa pro-
vides full coverage (with zero out-of-pocket payments) for various preventive treatments, including
periodical exams, well baby, etc. It is therefore important to know whether claims are associated
with preventive-related services, since cost sharing rules do not apply to such claims. A third issue,
which is typical of most health insurance plans, is the interaction between an individual deductible
and a family deductible (as well as analogous issues regarding individual and family out-of-pocket
maximums). In our data, the family deductible is always twice the individual deductible. For a
family with more than two covered individuals, it is therefore important to account for the interac-
tion among family members, as the cost sharing rules would vary depending on how the spending
is distributed among the family members. That is, a given individual in a family can exhaust his
deductible either by spending his individual deductible or by having the cumulative spending of
other members of the family reach the family deductible. In the construction of ci, we therefore
need to account for the composition of spending within the family.
Fortunately, the data are quite detailed and the plan rules are fairly simple (despite the above
issues), allowing us to calculate c(mi; j) with a great deal of accuracy. Indeed, our calculated
reimbursements (based on our application of the plan rules) and the actual reimbursements observed
in the data are almost the same. For example, for individuals with contract H the correlation
between their actual (observed) share of out-of-pocket spending (out of total expenditure) and
our constructed share is over 0.97. The same is true for contract L, or when we correlate levels of
expenditures instead of shares. Recall that we still need to apply our construction, because for each
individual we only observe the actual reimbursement for the contract he chose, while the second
element of ci is always a counterfactual. For consistency, we never use the actual reimbursement
and always compute ci by constructing both elements, c(mi;H) and c(mi;L).
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A.2. Robustness of the baseline estimates
In this section we explore the sensitivity of our welfare estimates to a number of alternative speci-
cations. Our overall nding is that the magnitude of the various welfare estimates discussed in the
paper even those that involve extrapolation considerably out of sample are qualitatively similar
across a range of alternative specications. In particular, across various alternative specications,
the welfare gain from a price subsidy that achieves the e¢ cient price is always substantially below
the social cost of the required price subsidy. Similarly, the welfare loss from competitive pricing
when choice over contracts is allowed is always lower than the welfare loss from mandatory coverage
by contract H, and the welfare cost of competitive pricing is always less than 10 percent of the total
surplus that could be generated from e¢ cient pricing. In the end of this section we also address
possible concerns regarding sample selection.
Functional form and theoretical restrictions on the demand curve. Table A2 summarizes some of
the sensitivity analyses. Panel A summarizes the implied welfare implications of each specication.
For completeness, Panel B shows the corresponding parameter estimates from each specication
(which are used to derive the welfare estimates shown in Panel A). In the interest of brevity we
focus our discussion primarily on the robustness of the resultant welfare estimates (columns (6)
through (8) of Panel A), which are our main interest. The rst row of Table A2 presents the results
from our baseline specication reported in the main text (see Table III). Subsequent rows report
results from a single, specied departure from this baseline.
Rows 2-5 in Table A2 explore the sensitivity of our results to our functional form assumptions.
Row 2 shows the results from our baseline specication are quite similar if we estimate a probit for
the demand equation rather than a linear demand. Unrestricted quadratic demand (not reported)
behaves very badly out of sample and is therefore not shown (but in row 5 we report and discuss a
restricted specication that includes a quadratic demand curve). As can be seen in Figure V, the
linear specication ts the cost data well.4
We also experimented with imposing restrictions on the demand curve that are implied by basic
price theory. Willingness to pay is (theoretically) bounded from above at $1,500 (the maximum
possible out-of-pocket savings from contract H; see Figure III) and (theoretically) bounded from
below by 0 (any rational individual should always prefer more coverage to less if the former is
o¤ered for free). Our baseline demand estimate (Table A2, row 1) satises the rst constraint (the
share of contract H becomes 0 at a price of $1,350), but not the second. At a price of 0, the share
of contract H is only 0.94.5 The results in row 3 show that constraining the share of contract H to
be 1 when price is 0 does not noticeably a¤ect our welfare estimates. Row 4 shows the results are
4We explored alternative functional forms for the cost curve, such as a quadratic, log-log, and log-linear functions.
Not surprisingly, the results (not shown) were very similar in sample. However, curvature (concavity in particular)
in the estimated AC curve sometimes led to out-of-sample predictions that were di¢ cult to interpret (such as non-
monotone MC curve). Given all these hard-to-interpret predictions were driven by out-of-sample predictions from
an ad hoc functional-form extrapolation, we prefer to simply reject such extrapolations and focus our discussion on
those extrapolation that seem to better behave(out of sample).
5One reason why we may estimate demand below 1 for a price of 0 is that our functional form assumption of
4
also similar if we impose the constraint that willingness to pay is bounded at $800, which may be a
more reasonable upper bound in practice than the theoretically possible $1,500.6 Row 5 estimates
a quadratic demand curve, imposing both the (1,$0) and the (0,$800) constraints on (Q,P), and
again resulting in welfare estimates that are quite stable.
Tax treatment of employee premiums. We also considered the sensitivity of our results to the tax
treatment of employee contributions to health insurance and to out-of-pocket medical expenditures.
Employee premium contributions are made pre-tax. Employees can pay their out-of-pocket medical
spending pre-tax as well, by contributing to a Flexible Spending Account (FSA). If all out-of-
pocket expenses were paid pre-tax, the tax treatment of employee premiums and employee medical
spending would be symmetric, and ignoring the tax subsidy to employee premiums (as we do
in our baseline specication) would be appropriate. However, in practice, less than a quarter of
Alcoa employees contribute to an FSA. It is of course unclear whether employees who do not take
advantage of the tax subsidy to out-of-pocket medical spending o¤ered by FSAs are cognizant of
the tax subsidy to employee premiums. However, to investigate the sensitivity of our ndings to
the tax subsidy, we consider the e¤ect on our estimates of assuming that all employees (including
those who contribute to FSAs) make their health insurance choices based on the pre-tax price.7 We
calculate the average tax subsidy (i.e. one minus the average marginal tax rate) for our sample to
be 65 percent.8 In row 6 we therefore re-estimate the baseline specication with the price variable in
both the demand and cost equations multiplied by 0.65. Once again the core welfare estimates are
linear demand is not appropriate for extrapolating this far out of sample. Another possible explanation may be that
contract L was the default option in 2004. We suspect that default may be less important in our setting than in
others because 2004 was the rst year in which the new benets were o¤ered. These new benets came with much
e¤ort by Alcoa to advertise and explain the new options to its employees, making it likely that most individuals were
activechoosers. Moreover, it is possible to have a model of defaults in which our welfare anlaysis is una¤ected. We
discuss this in a little more detail below.
6$1,500 out-of-pocket savings from contract H is only possible if the covered family members spend enough in-
network and out-of-network to hit the (separate) out-of-pocket maximums. In practice, this never occurs. Indeed,
none of the employees in our sample hits the out-of-pocket maximum out-of-network and only about 1 percent hits
the in-network out-of-pocket maximum. A potentially more reasonable constraint therefore is that willingness to pay
for contract H should not exceed $800, which is the reduction in out-of-pocket expenditures associated with contract
H if the family spends more than the deductible in-network and more than the deductible out-of-network but less
than the amount that would cause them to hit the out-of-pocket maximum (see Figure III).
7We do not observe in the data which individuals participate in the FSA.
8The tax subsidy is given by (1  f   s   ss   mcr) where f is the federal marginal tax rate, S is the state
marginal tax rate, ss is the marginal Social Security (FICA) payroll tax on the employee, and mcr is the marginal
Medicare payroll tax on the employee. We estimate these marginal tax rates using the NBERs TAXSIM model, which
takes as inputs the major determinants of marginal tax rates and computes the various marginal rates just mentioned.
Many of the required data elements (or reasonable proxies for them) are available in our companys data, including
annual wage and salary income, state, marital status, number of dependents and ages of family members. We assume
all employees with family coverage le jointly and do not itemize. We impute wage and salary income of spouse,
property income, and dividend income based on the ratio of each of these variables to own income for the sample of
full time, white collar manufacturing employees in the March CPS; we pool the 2004-2007 March CPS to increase
sample size (Table A1, column (8) presents descriptive statistics for this sample in the March 2005 CPS). All other
inputs required by TAXSIM are assumed to be zero. For more information on TAXSIM, see www.nber.org/taxsim.
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not noticeably a¤ected, although naturally our estimates of the equilibrium and e¢ cient allocations
(see columns (1) through (4)) shift considerably.
Additional covariates and alternative samples. Our baseline estimates of the demand and cost
curves include no covariates in the analysis besides the (relative) price. Only variables that are
priced should be controlled for in our analysis of selection and its welfare costs. The fact that, for
example, individuals of, say, di¤erent incomes or di¤erent ages may have di¤erent expected medical
costs, and that this may a¤ect which plan they choose, is part of the endogenous selection we wish
to study, rather than control for, since these characteristics are not priced. However, to allow for
the possibility that the price menu may be selected di¤erently across states in a systematic fashion
(e.g., reecting di¤erences in healthcare costs across states), in row 7 we include state xed e¤ects
in the demand and cost estimates. Although our estimates become somewhat less precise (see Panel
B of Table A2), the welfare implications remain quantitatively similar (Panel A). In row 8 we add
all of the contemporary employee characteristics (see Table I) as covariates to the demand and
cost curves (in addition to the state xed e¤ects).9 Once again the results are similar. The fact
that the slope of the estimated demand curve remains similar is unsurprising given the evidence in
Table I that pricing is orthogonal to these employee characteristics. The fact that the slope of the
estimated cost curve remains similar suggests that the adverse selection we detect is not driven by
the fact that in our setting the observable characteristics of employees are not priced.10
Finally, in row 9 we estimate our baseline specication using all four coverage tiers rather than
just employees with family coverage. Since prices vary by coverage tier, we include (de-meaned)
indicator variables for the coverage tier in both the demand and cost estimates.11 The parameter
estimates and welfare implications are quite similar to our baseline results.
We also tried restricting our baseline sample, specically by excluding the 199 individuals who
face the $570 (relative) price, which seem likely to a¤ect the demand estimates. Indeed, we found
that eliminating this points substantially reduces the demand elasticity (by about 45%) and it is
no longer statistically signicant. However, when we do so the average cost curve remains similar.
Thus, the steeper demand curve produces a steeper marginal cost curve, exacerbating the welfare
costs of ine¢ cient pricing due to selection. As a result, despite the steeper demand curve (which
all else equal should reduce welfare costs), our welfare estimate remains roughly the same ($9.77
compared to $9.55 in the baseline specication). This type of robustness exercise illustrates that
it is the combination of the demand and cost curves that together contribute to the magnitude of
9 In both rows 7 and 8 the covariates are demeaned so that the constant term is comparable across specications.
10 In this sense, the robustness test on the cost curve is one sided. Had we found that the slope of the cost curve
changed once we controlled for unpriced observables, this would not necessarily be a cause for concern. It could
simply reect the fact that much of the selection in our setting is driven by these unpriced observables.
11The price variable is dened for the chosen coverage tier. As noted earlier, for all employees the prices of contracts
in the other coverage tiers are always the same xed multiplier of the prices in the family coverage tier. To account
for the fact that for employee onlycoverage the deductible and out-of-pocket maximum is half of what it is for the
other three coverage tiers, we multiply price (pi) and cost (ci) by two for the 16% of employees with employee only
coverage.
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the welfare loss.
Possible sample selection. An important potential concern with all of the foregoing analyses
is that we limit the sample to only those who choose contract H or contract L, and exclude the
approximately one-third of salaried employees who chose one of the ve other available options.
These ve other options are an HMO (chosen by about 7% of salaried employees), opting out of
any employer-provided coverage (about 8%), two even lower coverage PPO options (3% in the two
of them combined), and a Health Reimbursement Account (HRA) PPO option, which combines a
high deductible health insurance policy with tax preferred employer contributions that can be used
to pay out-of-pocket expenses (approximately 17%).12
In practice, however, our analysis suggests that our sample selection is unlikely to have impor-
tant e¤ects on our demand estimates (and, of course, it is irrelevant for the estimate of the cost
curve which by design is run on the endogenously selected sample of individuals choosing contract
H). In particular, we found that the price of contract H relative to contract L (our key right-hand-
side variable) does not predict whether or not the employee opts into one of the two contracts we
study (contract H and contract L), as opposed to opting outinto one of the remaining options.
We suspect that this in part reects the fact that many of the other options (in particular the
three with non-trivial market share, the HMO, opting out of insurance, and the HRA) are quite
horizontally di¤erentiated.
Table A3 presents some of these ndings. The dependent variable in the reported linear regres-
sions is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the employee chose one of the outside
goods and 0 if he chose either contract H or contract L. The right-hand-side variable p is (as
before) the relative price of contract H compared to contract L. Column (1) reports the results for
employees with family coverage. We nd that a $100 increase in the (relative) price of contract H
is associated with an economically and statistically insignicant decline (of 0.09 percentage points)
in the probability of choosing one of the outside goods. Column (2) shows similar results when all
coverage tiers are pooled. A complication with both of these analyses is that because coverage tier
is not available for the 8% of the sample who opt out of coverage, these employees are excluded
from the analysis. In column (3) therefore we include in the sample the employees who opt out
of coverage. However, since coverage tier is not known for these employees we cannot control for
coverage tier and, moreover, we can no longer dene the price variable based on the coverage tier.
We instead assign all employees the family prices regardless of what coverage tier they actually
chose (if known).13 Once again there is no evidence that the relative price of contract H has an
12The in-network deductibles for the two lower coverage PPO options are $1,000 and $1,500. The high deductible
HRA PPO has a $3,000 in-network deductible, but the employee receives $1,250 tax free from Alcoa each year which
can be spent on eligible medical expenses (including but not limited to the plans cost sharing provisions). Unspent
funds in the HRA can be rolled over the subsequent years, but any unspent balance is forfeited upon separation from
Alcoa. The out-of-pocket maximums of all these options are also higher, but this is largely irrelevant empirically since
it is extremely rare (less than 1%) for any employee to hit the out-of-pocket maximum of even the most generous
option. Coinsurance rates are the same across all PPOs.
13Since, as noted, the prices of other coverage tiers are proportional to the family price, this is not an unreasonable
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economically or statistically signicant e¤ect on the probability of choosing the outside good.
A.3. Extensions
In this section we briey discuss several extensions to our application, following the discussion of
possible extensions to our framework in Sections II and III.
More than two coverage choices. As noted in Section III, it would be conceptually straight-
forward to extend our empirical analysis to consider more than two choices. However, we face
practical obstacles to doing so in our setting. In particular, as is typical in data sets like ours,
we do not observe medical expenditures for employees covered by an HMO or who opted out of
employer-provided coverage. We therefore cannot estimate the cost curve for these options. It is
also di¢ cult to model the demand for these two options, since the prices are not known, nor is
it entirely clear how to dene the good being purchased.14 We experimented with estimating
demand and cost systems for the remaining ve PPO options. However, the relatively small sample
sizes on the other three PPO options combined with the relatively high multi-collinearity in rela-
tive prices among the di¤erent PPO options resulted in fairly imprecise (and therefore relatively
uninformative) estimates of the demand and cost systems.
Moral hazard. As we discussed in Section III.B, our framework also allows us to easily test for
and quantify moral hazard, which is dened by the vertical distance between MCH and MCL.
Moreover, as discussed in Section II.D, when contract L provides partial coverage (as in our appli-
cation) moral hazard will a¤ect the welfare analysis. Therefore it is important to examine moral
hazard empirically in our setting.
With two partial coverage contracts, cHi is dened as the incremental cost to the insurer of
covering employee i with contract H rather than with contract L assuming i behaves as if he is
covered by contract H. Analogously, cLi is the incremental cost to the insurer of covering employee
i with contract H rather than with contract L assuming i behaves as if he is covered by contract
L. Our foregoing estimates of AC, which were estimated on the sample of individuals who chose
contract H, therefore gives us ACH . And our estimate of MC, using our estimate of ACH and our
estimate of the demand curve for H (equation (11)), similarly gives us MCH . To estimate ACL
we estimate the same cost equation (equation (12)) but on the sample of individuals who chose
contract L: To back out MCL from ACL we use the demand curve for contract L, i.e. equation
(11) estimated with Di replaced by 1 Di.
We have run this exercise on our baseline sample and were unable to reject the null of no moral
hazard (i.e. H0 :MCL =MCH). Our estimates were quite imprecise, suggesting that we may lack
approach.
14The price of the HMO is literally not known, and likely varies across geographic areas. Employees receive a
$1,000 credit if they opt out of any coverage. However, without knowing what price they face for purchasing
insurance outside the company it is not clear what the true price is. Relatedly, in contrast to the PPO options, the
characteristics of the HMO option and any coverage o¤ered outside the rm are not known.
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su¢ cient power in our setting to detect moral hazard. This may not be surprising given that the
design of the insurance contracts in our setting (see Figure III) should make moral hazard primarily
a¤ect those employees who expect to spend less than the contract L deductible. In practice, this
is likely to be a small fraction of our data.15
As a di¤erent way to make this point, we applied the widely used moral hazard estimate of
Manning et al. (1987)16 from the Rand Health Insurance Experiment to the total spending of each
employee covered by contract H. We assumed a price e¤ect which is based on the change in the
marginal cost-sharing this employee would face under contract L compared to contract H, holding
his realized (rather than expected) spending xed. This back-of-the-envelope calculation led to an
average change in insurers cost of 3%, driven by the fact that three quarters of the employees did
not experience any change in marginal cost sharing. In light of this, we nd it unsurprising that it
is hard to detect moral hazard in this setting.
Departures from revealed preference. As we noted at the outset, our approach to welfare analysis
has relied on revealed preferences. It is possible to use our framework for welfare analysis when
we are not willing to assume revealed preferences, although this would require specication of the
precise alternative choice model and how it maps to welfare. Some behavioralmodels are easily
translated to our approach. Consider, for example, the possible role of defaults. The default option
in our setting is contract L. If one believes that there is a (constant) fraction  of the sample
who always chooses the default, then it is possible to implement our approach, and perform welfare
analysis on the remaining 1   share of the sample, who are activechoosers.
15Considering in-network spending, there are 9% of the employees in our baseline sample who spend less than the
contract L (in-network) deductible of $500. Out-of-network spending would increase this share (but not by much).
16Manning, Willard G., Joseph P. Newhouse, Naihua Duan, Emmett B. Keeler, Arleen Leibowitz, and M. Susan
Marquis, Health insurance and the demand for medical care: Evidence from a randomized experiment,American
Economic Review, 77 (1987), 251-277.
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Table A1: Summary statistics
All employees Only salariedemployees
Only salaried
employees with new
benefit design
Col. (3) limited to
only employees
who chose H  or L
Col. (4) limited to
employees with
family coverage
All full-time
employees
Only in
manufacturing
White collar
employees  in
manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of Individuals 36,814 11,964 11,325 7,263 3,779 83,118 11,178 4,688
Fraction Male 0.78 0.73 0.73 0.77 0.86 0.58 0.70 0.64
Fraction White 0.77 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.82 0.82 0.86
Fraction unionized 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.14 0.04
Age
        Mean 44.24 44.51 44.50 45.17 42.66 41.39 42.13 42.87
        Std. Deviation 9.86 9.22 9.21 9.12 7.22 12.33 11.45 10.88
        Median 45 45 45 46 43 41 42 43
Tenure with company (years)
        Mean 13.23 13.26 13.23 13.69 12.70 n/a n/a n/a
        Std. Deviation 10.28 9.95 9.96 10.01 8.93 n/a n/a n/a
        Median 11 12 12 13 12 n/a n/a n/a
Annual Salary (current $US)
        Mean 53,103 71,622 72,821 74,017 80,999 41,869 46,195 63,157
        Std. Deviation 47,642 77,936 79,373 91,530 112,790 47,955 45,435 58,072
        Median 47,283 60,484 61,433 61,822 66,335 32,000 35,000 50,000
2004 Company Data March 2005 CPS
Columns (1) to (5) present summary statistics for di¤erent cuts of the 2004 Alcoa employees. Column (1) presents
statistics for all active employees in our sample, column (2) for salaried employees only. Column (3) looks at a slightly
smaller group of salaried employees who faced the new benet design, and column (4) further restricts attention to
salaried employees who chose either contractH or contract L (who are the primary focus of our analysis). Column (5)
further limits the analysis to those who chose family coverage; this sample is used to generate our baseline estimates.
For comparison, columns (6) to (8) present summary statistics for full time employees (dened as those who on
average worked 35 or more hours per week in the previous year) in the March 2005 CPS. Column (6) shows all full
time employees, column (7) shows all full time employees in manufacturing industries, and column (8) shows all full
time white collar employees (dened based on occupation codes) in manufacturing industries; in these three columns
we use CPS sampling weights (earning weights for the union variable, and person weights for all others).
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Table A2: Robustness
Panel A: Welfare estimates from different specifications
Q P Q P
In dollar terms
(per market
participant)a
Relative to
social cost of
efficient
subsidyb
Relative to
welfare cost of
mandating
contract H c
Relative to
total
achievable
welfared
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1  Baseline (family coverage, no state fixed-effects) 0.617 463.51 0.756 263.94 9.55 21.1% 32.4% 3.4%
   Robustness to demand estimates
2     Probit demand 0.619 463.59 0.790 187.85 11.32 17.3% 31.6% 3.5%
3     Linear demand, constrained to go through (Q,P)=(1,$0) 0.612 463.56 0.750 299.04 7.81 21.1% 30.2% 3.4%
4     Linear demand, constrained to go through (Q,P)=(0,$800) 0.562 463.59 0.688 387.90 3.30 21.1% 16.4% 3.4%
5     Quadratic demand, constrained to go through (1,$0) and (0,$800) 0.587 463.58 0.738 343.51 5.00 18.8% 45.6% 4.5%
   Robustness to tax subsidy
6     Baseline specification, but accouting for pre-tax premiums 0.389 514.49 0.567 348.53 7.71 27.3% 16.8% 9.8%
   Robustness to sample and source of variation
7     State fixed-effects included (in both demand and cost regressions) 0.622 460.16 0.699 341.40 3.65 14.6% 6.5% 1.2%
8     State fixed-effects and demographics included (in both regressions) 0.641 440.00 0.724 306.67 4.42 15.3% 9.2% 1.3%
9     All coverage tiers, no state fixed-effectse 0.593 434.20 0.704 244.83 7.67 19.2% 14.2% 2.5%
10   Baseline specification, without the $570 price group 0.641 460.57 0.740 202.09 9.77 17.0% 14.5% 1.8%
Competitive
Equilibrium Efficient Allocation Welfare cost of Adverse Selection
Panel B: Parameter estimates from different specifications
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
1  Baseline (family coverage, no state fixed-effects) 0.940 (0.123) -0.00070 (0.00032) 391.7 (26.8) 0.155 (0.064)
   Robustness to demand estimates
2     Probit demand 1.149 (0.316) -0.00183 (0.00080)
3     Linear demand, constrained to go through (Q,P)=(1,$0) 1.000 (imposed) -0.00084 (0.00005)
4     Linear demand, constrained to go through (Q,P)=(0,$800) 1.333 (imposed) -0.00167 (0.00005)
5     Quadratic demand, constrained to go through (1,$0) and (0,$800)f 1.000 (imposed) -0.00039 (imposed)
-1.1E-06 (1.2E-07)
   Robustness to tax subsidy
6     Baseline specification, but accouting for pre-tax premiums 0.940 (0.123) -0.00107 (0.00048) 391.7 (26.8) 0.239 (0.098)
   Robustness to sample and source of variation
7     State fixed-effects included (in both regressions) 0.919 (0.167) -0.00065 (0.00040) 414.8 (37.0) 0.099 (0.090)
8     State fixed-effects and demographics included (in both regressions) 0.917 (0.170) -0.00063 (0.00040) 394.5 (36.9) 0.104 (0.091)
9     All coverage tiers, no state fixed-effectse 0.848 (0.109) -0.00059 (0.00032) 374.8 (22.8) 0.137 (0.062)
10   Baseline specification, without the $570 price group 0.818 (0.195) -0.00038 (0.00050) 406.3 (34.0) 0.118 (0.081)
Demand Equation Average Cost Equation
alpha beta gamma delta
------ same as Baseline ------
------ same as Baseline ------
------ same as Baseline ------
------ same as Baseline ------
Table reports results from alternative specications. Panel B reports parameter estimates, and Panel A reports the
(corresponding) implications for welfare analysis. Row 1 replicates the results from the baseline specication (as in
Table III), rows 2-5 report specications that change the functional form of demand. Row 6 re-estimates the baseline
specication with the price in both the demand and cost equation multiplied by 0.65 (one minus the average marginal
tax rate in the sample). Row 7 includes state xed e¤ects in both the demand and cost equations, and row 8 also
controls for employee characteristics (listed in Table I). Row 9 increases the sample to include employees in all four
coverage tiers. Row 10 tries to assess sensitivity to dropping the $570 price group, which is the greatest outlier (see
Figure V). Standard errors (in parentheses) allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix within each state.
a Graphically, this is the area of triangle CDE (see Figure I).
b This is triangle CDE divided by 0:3Qeff (P eq P eff ).
c Graphically, this is the area of triangle CDE divided by the area of triangle EGH (see Figure I).
d Graphically, this is the area of triangle CDE divided by the area of triangle ABE (see Figure I).
e N=7,263 for demand analysis, 4,622 for cost analysis; mean dependent variables are 0.64 (D) and $424 (c),
respectively. We include (de-meaned) indicator variables for the coverage tier in both the demand and cost equations
(not shown); we multiply p and c by two for employees in the employee onlycoverage tier.
f In the quadratic demand specication, the top reported coe¢ cient of beta is the coe¢ cient on the linear term,
while the second is the coe¢ cient on the quadratic term.
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Table A3: Potential sample selection
Dependent variable:
"Outside good" does
include "opt out"
Family coverage tier only All coverage tiers All coverage tiers
(1) (2) (3)
Relative price -0.0000093 -0.000021 0.000002
(0.00035) (0.00040) (0.000003)
[0.98] [0.96] [0.66]
Constant 0.287 0.292 0.296
(0.1580) (0.1150) (0.1580)
[0.08] [0.02] [0.07]
Mean dependent variable 0.283 0.300 0.359
Number of obs. 5,271 10,386 11,325
"Outside Good" does not include "opt out"
1 if "outside good" was chosen, 0 otherwise
The table reports results of estimating a variant of the demand equation shown in equation (11). The dependent
variable is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the employee chose any of the outside options and 0
if the employee chose either contract H or contract L. The relative price variable is, as in Table II, the relative
price of contract H compared to contract L. In columns (1) and (2) the outside goodincludes two lower coverage
PPOs, a Health Reimbursement Account PPO, and an HMO. The sample in column (1) is limited to family coverage.
The sample in column (2) includes all coverage tiers. We therefore include (de-meaned) indicator variables for the
coverage tier (not shown) and multiply the price variable by two for employees in the employee onlycoverage tier.
In column (3) the outside good denition is expanded to also include employees who opt out of coverage. Since
coverage tier is not known for these employees, we include all employees regardless of coverage tier and do not include
indicator variables for coverage tier. We dene the price variable as the relative price associated with family coverage
(regardless of the actual tier chosen, if known). All estimates are generated by OLS, standard errors (in parentheses)
allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix within each state, ; p-values are in [square brackets].
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